Usually, it is the plaintiff that argues he or she was injured, not the defendant. But, in an effort to stay in state court, some TCPA plaintiffs have taken the counterintuitive position that they did not suffer an injury in fact under Article III of the U.S. Constitution and, therefore, their claims cannot be heard in federal court.
“[T]o satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–181 (2000).
As we have reported here and here, courts throughout the country, including most notably the Eleventh Circuit in Salcedo v. Hanna, have grappled with the question of whether a single unsolicited text message may constitute sufficient injury to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement in Article III. The Salcedo court held that one text message does not suffice.
But what about a single fax? That was the question recently presented to the Middle District of Florida in Daisy, Inc. v. Mobile Mini, Inc., No. 20-0017 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2020). The court similarly found that, at least under the relatively unique circumstances of the case, a single fax did not confer standing.
The District of Oregon recently found that a $925,220,000 damages award was not unconstitutionally excessive, reasoning that due process does not limit the aggregate statutory damages that can be awarded in a class action lawsuit under the TCPA. Wakefield v. ViSalus, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-1857, 2020 WL 4728878 (D. Or. Aug. 14, 2020).
As we previously explained, when the trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for treble damages, the jury in the Wakefield case found that the defendant had violated the TCPA by placing 1,850,436 telemarketing calls. Id. at *1. Because the TCPA’s minimum statutory penalty is $500 per violation, the defendant faced aggregate damages of $925,220,000. Id. at *2.
Does a “call placed in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, without any allegation or showing of injury—even that plaintiffs heard the phone ring—suffice to establish concrete injury for purposes of Article III [of the Constitution?]” Recently, Dish Network petitioned the Supreme Court to resolve this question and overturn a verdict rendered by a North Carolina federal jury that was later trebled to $61 million and upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Briefing on Dish Network’s petition is now complete and we now await the Court’s decision on whether it will review the case.
May 4, 2017 was Star Wars Day (“May the Fourth . . .”), but it also marked the date of FCC Commissioner Michael O’Rielly’s speech to the ACA International Washington Insights Conference. Commissioner O’Rielly opened with a joke about the number of times ACA had to call him before he had the opportunity to accept its speaking invitation, and then moved on to discuss a number of ways in which he feels the TCPA has been expanded beyond the intended scope of the statute. O’Rielly cited ACA research showing that between 2010 and 2015 there was a 948 percent increase in litigants involved in TCPA-related lawsuits, but noted that “despite this, there is reason for optimism” with the change in FCC leadership. Continue reading
In TCPA Blog’s latest Law360 column, Mike Daly, Justin Kay, and Victoria Andrews examine the differences in courts’ decisions regarding whether the receipt of a single call or text can be considered concrete harm for the purposes of constitutional standing in TCPA actions. The article first discusses state law claims that are routinely dismissed for lack of sufficient injury because the plaintiff alleged receipt of only one fax or text. It then reviews recent TCPA claims that have been dismissed based upon similar reasoning, and compares them against those that have found that any alleged violation of the statute establishes sufficient injury to confer constitutional standing. In doing so, the article addresses why the second line of cases employs faulty reasoning and fails to adhere to Congress’ intent and goals in enacting the TCPA: Continue reading