Since our December 8, 2015 blog post regarding the scope of vicarious liability, courts have continued to wrestle with the scope of vicarious liability under the TCPA and its ramifications with respect to class certification. A recent decision denying class certification based on lack of ascertainability of the class and commonality issues from the Southern District of Ohio in Barrett v. ADT Corp., No. 15-cv-1348, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28767 (S.D. Ohio March 7, 2016), illustrates why class certification is an uphill battle in this context for plaintiffs in TCPA litigation. Continue reading
The Southern District of Alabama recently denied a plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval of a proposed classwide settlement of TCPA claims. See Bennett v. Boyd Biloxi, LLC, No. 14-0330-WS-M, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163987 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 7, 2015). The plaintiff claims that he and some 70,000 other people received unlawful telemarketing calls promoting the defendant’s casino, resort, and spa. Describing the plaintiff’s motion as a “somewhat pro forma” submission that did not “come close to bearing his burden of persuading the Court to certify the proposed settlement class,” the court sent him back to the drawing board “to research and effectively present the legal argument . . . needed to support certification.”
On Tuesday the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, which concerns (among other things) whether courts can certify classes that are defined in a way that would include people who do not have Article III standing. For those who were unable to attend the argument, a transcription of the argument is available here.
Defendants’ discussions of the Third Circuit’s recent decisions in Leyse v. Bank of America and Dominguez v. Yahoo have been all doom and gloom. Some of that disappointment is understandable, as the Third Circuit vacated notable defense rulings and expanded the scope of consumers who have statutory standing to file suit under the TCPA. On closer examination, however, both of the decisions offer not only a sword to plaintiffs but a shield to defendants. This is the first of two posts that will dissect those decisions and discuss their implications for the ever-growing number of defendants that are facing TCPA claims.
An essential requirement for certifying a class under Rule 23 is a means for presently ascertaining who is or is not a member of the proposed class. A trio of recent district court decisions has applied this ascertainability requirement to proposed TCPA class actions. The cases reach different conclusions as to whether a list of telephone numbers is a necessary or sufficient means of ascertaining class membership.
The Middle District of Florida recently denied class certification because the plaintiff failed to prove that consent (or more to the point, an alleged lack of consent) could be established on a classwide basis. In doing so, it confirmed that class action plaintiffs have the burden of proving that issues are susceptible to classwide proof even though a defendant may bear the burden of proving or disproving some of those issues at trial. See Shamblin v. Obama for Am., No. 13-2428, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54849 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2015).
A court in the Northern District of Illinois recently denied class certification in a “fax blast” case because the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof in showing that the putative class was ascertainable where there was no evidence identifying the recipients of the faxes. Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. Alma Lasers, Inc., et al., No. 12-4978, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41339 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2015).
From the perspective of defense counsel, this case is a reminder of the importance of holding plaintiffs to their burden proof in showing that all of Rule 23’s requirements are satisfied when opposing a motion for class certification. As we have written previously, plaintiffs face a hurdle in showing a class is ascertainable where there is no objective criteria establishing the identities of recipients of a particular communication.
In Zarichny v. Complete Payment Recovery Servs., Civ. No. 14-3197, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6556 (Jan. 21, 2015), Plaintiff Sandra Zarichny attempted to bring a class action on behalf of two classes against defendants Fidelity National Information Services (“FIS”) and Complete Payment Recovery Services (“CPRS”). Id. at *1-2. Zarichny alleges that the defendants called her eleven times because they incorrectly believed that she owed a debt based on her alleged failure to return textbooks that she rented. Id. at 7-8. In her complaint, Zarichny alleged that the Defendants deliberately harassed her by calling at inconvenient times. Id. at 9. Zarichny alleged that both corporations violated the TCPA and the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (the “FDCPA”).
Fidelity and CPRS brought a motion to dismiss Zarichny’s complaint and a motion to strike her class allegations, which the court granted in part and denied in part.
Judge Kathleen M. Williams of the Southern District of Florida handed GEICO a decisive victory on September 29, 2014, when she denied a renewed motion to certify a class of individuals who purportedly received robo-calls from GEICO because she found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient proof of numerosity.
The statutory damages that have caused so many plaintiffs to file TCPA class actions have also caused some courts to find that class actions are not the superior method for adjudicating them. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) requires not only that common questions predominate over individual ones, but also that “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Whether a class action is the superior method for adjudication depends on a number of stated and unstated considerations, among them “the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A). As we have noted before, some courts have held that TCPA claims are categorically unfit for class treatment because $500-$1,500 plus attorneys’ fees and costs is adequate to incent individuals to file claims, is disproportionate to any actual damages, and is potentially ruinous if aggregated in a class action. Two state courts recently addressed this issue and reached contrary conclusions.