Today at 11:00 a.m., the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology will be holding a hearing entitled “Modernizing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.” The purpose of the hearing is for the Subcommittee to “consider the challenges faced by consumers and companies in a world where technology and consumer behavior may have outpaced the language of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.” Continue reading
On May 9, 2016, the Sixth Circuit reversed a decision of the Northern District of Ohio granting summary judgment to Defendant in a TCPA fax case. Siding & Insulation Co. v. Alco Vending, Inc., No. 15-3551. The district court had accepted Defendant’s argument that it could not be liable under the TCPA for sending the allegedly offending faxes because while it did retain an ad agency (B2B/Caroline Abraham, a combination known well to practitioners in this space) to transmit faxes advertising its services to consenting businesses, it had never authorized transmission of faxes to non-consenting businesses, including the Plaintiff. Finding that under federal common-law agency principles Defendant could not be held vicariously liable for sending the faxes because it neither authorized the transmission of the offending faxes, nor ratified the ad agency’s conduct, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Continue reading
Two federal courts in the Third Circuit recently compelled individual arbitration in TCPA actions. See Raynor v. Verizon Wireless, No. 15-5914, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54678 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2016); Herndon v. Green Tree Serv. LLC, No. 15-1202, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53937 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2016). Issued just a few days apart in cases against a telecommunications provider and a mortgage broker, these decisions serve as a helpful reminder to businesses to consider including arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts—and to explore their applicability when facing TCPA litigation. Continue reading
In Hannabury v. Hilton Grand Vacation Co., LLC, No. 14-cv-6126, 2016 WL 1181789 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2016), the District Court for the Western District of New York held that a named plaintiff’s TCPA claims do not survive his death.
Plaintiff had filed a putative class action against Hilton for placing calls to his cell phone in an attempt to sell interests in timeshare properties, even though he alleged that his phone number was listed on the national Do Not Call Registry. The named plaintiff, however, passed away before moving to certify a class. His estate brought a motion to substitute itself as the named plaintiff. Continue reading
In TCPA Blog’s latest Law360 column, contributors Eduardo Guzmán, Michael Daly and Anthony Glosson discuss the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Lynn v. Monarch Recovery Management Inc. They explain that the opinion has analytical gaps, leaves unanswered questions, and does not mean that calls to residential VoIP-based telephony services should necessarily be treated differently than calls to other residential:
In short, unpublished opinion in Lynn v. Monarch Recovery Management Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that the “call-charged provision” of the TCPA applied to debt collection calls made to a residential VoIP-based line. The plaintiffs’ bar responded by suggesting that the TCPA applies differently to so-called “VoIP calls,” and telemarketing vendors responded by marketing services that scrub all numbers assigned to VoIP carriers — a move that, given VoIP’s increasing popularity, could end up eliminating a substantial percentage of residential numbers. However, a more objective analysis of the opinion and the issues suggests that these reactions may be overstated, if not altogether misplaced.
They go on to explain that predictions about the decision’s consequences may be wrong because it: (1) is unpublished and nonprecedential; (2) involved a highly unusual fact pattern; and (3) has serious gaps in its interpretation of the scope and application of the “call-charged provision.
In its October 2014 Final Order (the “Anda Order”), the Federal Communications Commission found that it had the statutory authority to regulate solicited faxes by promulgating a rule that requires an opt-out notice on all such faxes, but also found that because of reasonable confusion surrounding the regulation, there was good cause to waive the rule for fax senders who had previously sent solicited faxes without the opt-out notice. Continue reading