District Court Holds Article III Standing Allegation Not Required to Remove

As we have frequently discussed, Article III standing is a recurring issue in TCPA cases. The Southern District of Florida recently added to the precedent in this area when it denied a plaintiff’s motion to remand, holding that defendants did not need to concede plaintiff’s Article III standing in their notice of removal. Gonzalez v. TCR Sports Broadcasting Holding, LLP, No. 18-cv-20048, 2018 WL 4292018 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2018). Continue reading   »

Ninth Circuit Heats Up TCPA Debate With Broad Autodialer Take

As discussed here on the Blog, the Ninth Circuit ruled last Friday in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC that equipment need not have the capacity to dial numbers randomly or sequentially to be an ATDS under the TCPA. Rather, according to the Ninth Circuit, it is sufficient for equipment to have the capacity “to store numbers to be called . . . and to dial such numbers automatically (even if the system must be turned on or triggered by a person)” to be an ATDS.

Law360 also published an article addressing the impact of the decision entitled “Ninth Circuit Heats Up TCPA Debate With Broad Autodialer Take,” and TCPA Blog contributor Justin Kay was quoted in the article. Continue reading   »

Ninth Circuit Expands the Definition of an ATDS

The very first clause in the TCPA is the definition of an Automatic Telephone Dialing System, which the statute defines as “equipment which has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 47 USC 227(a)(1). Notwithstanding this limited definition, the Ninth Circuit today ruled in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC that an ATDS means more than what the statute says. It did so by reordering the aforementioned definition’s words and replacing a conjunctive “and” with a disjunctive “or,” and holding that the term ATDS actually “means equipment which has the capacity—(1) to store numbers to be called or (2) to produce numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator—and to dial such numbers automatically (even if the system must be turned on or triggered by a person).” (emphasis added). By separating and reordering these clauses to de-couple the “random or sequential number generator” requirement from the storage requirement, the Ninth Circuit appears to have re-introduced (at least in the Ninth Circuit, and at least for now) the same over breadth and uncertainty that the D.C. Circuit appeared to rectify with its decision in ACA International. Continue reading   »

Another District Court Rejects FCC Prior Orders on ATDS in Light of ACA International

One of the central issues before the D.C. Circuit in ACA International v. FCC was whether the FCC’s vague and expansive definition of an ATDS would withstand judicial scrutiny. It did not, and as we explained at the time the decision was issued, the D.C. Circuit set aside not only the portion of the FCC’s July 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order pertaining to ATDS, but also the FCC’s prior rulings dating back to 2003. Following ACA International, and while the FCC considers how to amend its now-invalidated prior rulings, the plaintiffs’ bar has attempted to narrow the reach of ACA International, arguing that the D.C. Circuit set aside only the 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order, and that the validity of the FCC’s prior rulings was not under review. Just as the D.C. Circuit rejected this argument, district courts across the country continue to reject this argument, most recently a federal district court in the Central District of California. Continue reading   »

Trial Courts Split On Whether Consumers Can Unilaterally Revoke Contractual Consent

As we discussed last year, the Second Circuit has held that consumers cannot unilaterally revoke consent that was provided as part of a bilateral contract. See Reyes v. Lincoln Automotive Fin. Servs., 861 F.3d 51 (2017). In doing so, it explained that it is “black letter law” that a “party may not alter a bilateral
contract . . . without the consent of a counterparty,” and that nothing in the TCPA purports to “permit a consumer to revoke his consent to be called when that consent forms part of a bargained-for exchange.” Although this seemingly straightforward statement is now settled within the Second Circuit, see, e.g., Harris v. Navient Solutions, LLC, No. 15-0546, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140317 (D. Conn. Aug. 7, 2018), it remains unsettled elsewhere. Continue reading   »

Eighth Circuit Rules No Standing For TCPA Plaintiffs Due to Lack of Traceability

We have previously written—both in this blog and in articles—about district courts dismissing TCPA claims after finding that the alleged injuries were not “traceable to” (i.e., caused by) the purported TCPA violations. Last week, the Eighth Circuit in St. Louis Heart Center, Inc. v. Nomax, Inc., — F.3d —, 2018 WL 3719694 (8th Cir. Aug. 6, 2018), held that plaintiff and a putative class lacked Article III standing to allege that fax advertisements did not contain a proper opt-out notice. Defendant had moved to dismiss the case for lack of Article III standing after removing the case from state court and the district court dismissed the claim because the alleged injuries were not traceable to the purported TCPA violation. Continue reading   »

Court Cites Supreme Court’s China Agritech Decision In Decertifying TCPA Class Action

The Northern District of Illinois recently granted a motion to decertify a class of TCPA plaintiffs in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800 (2018), which held that the equitable tolling doctrine does not apply to successive class actions. See Practice Mgmt. Support Servs., Inc. v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., No. 14-2032, 2018 WL 3659349 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2018). In doing so, the court observed that plaintiffs can no longer “wait out” a statute of limitations and then “piggy back on an earlier, timely filed class action.” Id. at *1. Continue reading   »

Texas Federal Court Compels Arbitration of TCPA Claims, Grants Motion of Nonsignatory to Agreement

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas recently granted a defendant debt collection agency’s motion to compel arbitration in a TCPA case. See Bow v. Ad Astra Recovery Servs., Inc., No. 18-0510-G, 2018 WL 3455510 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2018) (available here). In doing so, the court enforced an arbitration agreement that the debt collection agency had never signed, on the ground that the agreement expressly referenced the agency as an “affiliate” of the two lenders that had signed the agreement. The court’s decision provides helpful guidance for enforcing arbitration agreements, particularly in the context of a loan agreement that may lead to debt collection efforts—and potential TCPA exposure. Continue reading   »

Court Denies Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motion, Cites Factual Dispute Regarding Whether Plaintiff Revoked Consent

The Eastern District of Michigan recently denied a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because the defendant raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiff had revoked his consent to receive the challenged calls. See Mayang v. PAR Grp., Inc., No. 17-12447, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118784 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2018). Continue reading   »