The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida recently issued two opinions in one case—Powell v. YouFit Health Clubs, LLC—that highlight the hurdles that plaintiffs can face in demonstrating typicality, ascertainability, and predominance when TCPA claims purportedly arise from consumer contracts.
In Powell v. YouFit Health Clubs, LLC, No. 17-62328, 2019 WL 926131 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2019), Traci Powell alleged that YouFit Health Clubs had violated the TCPA by sending “dual purpose text messages.” Plaintiff claimed that she was a former member of YouFit and that, after she cancelled her membership and paid her outstanding balance, she received two text messages that stated, in relevant part, “YOUFIT BALANCE FORGIVENESS: Get 1 year for $99 . . . to clear your past due balance.” She claimed that the texts had falsely stated that consumers had balances due on their accounts and had been sent without their consent. Continue reading
Recently, an Eastern District of Michigan court entered summary judgment in favor of a defendant upon finding that it had neither transmitted nor caused the transmission of the fax at issue. In Garner Properties & Management, LLC v. Marblecast of Michigan, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that it had received an unsolicited fax that referenced the products of two companies: Marblecast of Michigan and American Woodmark. The plaintiff sued both companies in a putative class action. American Woodmark eventually moved for summary judgment and argued that the plaintiff had failed to offer evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that it had “sent” the fax at issue. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (“It shall be unlawful for any . . . to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement, unless. . . .”) (emphasis added). In opposition, the plaintiff argued that American Woodmark was strictly liable as a sender under the TCPA because the fax had referenced its products. Continue reading
At the Federal Communications Bar Association’s TCPA symposium in D.C. last month, panelists from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and private practice expressed uncertainty regarding when the D.C. Circuit would issue its much-anticipated ruling in the appeal of the FCC’s July 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order (the “2015 Order”). It turns out that that day is today. And the ruling was well worth the wait. Continue reading
On December 22, 2017, the FTC issued its Biennial Report to Congress on the National Do-Not-Call Registry, which lists the telephone numbers at which individuals have requested that they not be called by telemarketers. The report provides an overview of the Registry’s operations for 2016 and 2017 and guidance for continued compliance with the Registry in 2018 and beyond. The key takeaways from the Report are discussed below. Continue reading
A recent decision from the District of Maryland denied the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the Plaintiff had in the Court’s view raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he had revoked his consent to receive automated debt-related calls. But the Court also denied the Plaintiff’s motion for class certification for the same reason, finding that individualized issues regarding the provision and revocation of that consent would predominate over any alleged common issues. See Ginwright v. Exeter Fin. Corp., No. 16-0565 (D. Md. Nov. 28, 2017). Continue reading
The Third Circuit recently vacated a trial court’s decision that members of a putative class were not readily ascertainable by reference to objective criteria. City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of North America Inc., 867 F.3d 434 (3d Cir. 2017). Although it did not find that a class was in fact ascertainable, it held that the trial court misapplied the ascertainability standard and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 443. Continue reading
After awarding a judgment as a matter of law at the close of plaintiffs’ case, Judge E. Richard Webber of the Eastern District of Missouri reduced the award because statutory damages of $500 per call would have been “obviously unreasonable and wholly disproportionate to the offense,” making it unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case. Golan v. Veritas Entm’t, LLC, No. 14-0069, 2017 WL 3923162, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 7, 2017).
Last week the Eleventh Circuit held that a consumer can revoke her consent not only orally but also partially. See Schweitzer v. Comenity Bank, No. 16-10498 (11th Cir. Aug. 10, 2017). The rule it announced would be a double-edged sword that makes it more difficult not only for defendants to comply with the TPCA, but also for plaintiffs to satisfy Rule 23.
The plaintiff in Schweitzer provided her cellular telephone number—and, by doing so, her consent to be called at that number—when she applied for a card from the defendant. See Opinion at 3. When she failed to make timely payments on that credit card a year later, the defendant allegedly placed “hundreds” of “automated” calls regarding her debt. The plaintiff answered at least two of those calls. Id. During the first, she said “And, if you guys cannot call me, like, in the morning and during the work day, because I’m working, and I can’t really be talking about these things while I’m at work.” Id. at 4. During the second, she said “Can you just please stop calling? I’d appreciate that, thank you very much.” Id. The defendant continued calling after the first exchange, but stopped calling after the second. Id. Continue reading
The Eastern District of Michigan recently dismissed a TCPA claim with prejudice after finding that the single fax at issue did not constitute an advertisement. See Matthew N. Fulton, D.D.S., P.C. v. Enclarity, Inc., No. 16-13777, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28439 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 1, 2017). In doing so, it reaffirmed the Sixth Circuit’s position that, in deciding whether a fax is an advertisement, courts should not look beyond the four corners of the document and should ask whether it “‘promote[s] goods or services to be bought or sold’” and “‘ha[s] profit as an aim.’” Id. at *4 (citation omitted). Continue reading