Continued Confusion Concerning Whether Professional Plaintiffs Have Standing

Two courts recently examined whether professional plaintiffs had standing to assert TCPA claims. Their decisions betray a continuing confusion concerning what it is that gives plaintiffs—particularly serial plaintiffs—standing to sue. See Cunningham v. Florio, No. 17-0839, 2018 WL 4473792 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2018); Morris v. Hornet Corp., No. 17-0350, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170945 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2018). Continue reading   »

Nasty Political Campaign Results In Potential Liability For VoIP Providers But Not Voice Actors

As we approach the November 2018 midterm elections, we expect that we will once again see (i) an uptick in the volume of political calls; (ii) a reminder from the FCC that the TCPA applies to those calls (emphasizing that such calls are prohibited if made to cell phones without the consent of the called party, and that all prerecorded calls to cell phones or landlines must comply with certain identification and line release requirements); and (iii) a handful of new lawsuits filed against campaigns, candidates, and committees that allegedly failed to heed the FCC’s warning—all topics we have covered here before. Two recent decisions from a federal court in West Virginia pertaining to the 2016 election serve as a reminder that these lawsuits can linger long after the election ends Continue reading   »

Mind the Details: Defendant Observes that Key FCC Order Never Took Effect; Wins Judgment on Pleadings

A new case out of Indiana, Sanford v. Navient Solutions, LLC, 2018 WL 4699890 (S.D. IN Oct. 01, 2018), underscores the importance of delving into the details of the FCC materials on which plaintiffs rely to support their claims.

In Sanford, relatively straightforward allegations—the defendant’s continued use of autodialed calls after the plaintiff revoked consent—were complicated by the fact that the federal government owned the debt at issue in the calls. The TCPA prohibits “mak[ing] any call (other than a call made for emergency purpose or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice” to “a cellular telephone service   . . . unless such call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). Continue reading   »

Court Holds Web-Based Texting Platform is Not an ATDS Because of Need for Human Intervention

A federal district court in the Southern District of Florida joined a list of courts that have found a web-based text messaging platform to fall outside the purview of the TCPA due to the amount of human intervention required to send a text message. In Ramos v. Hopele of Fort Lauderdale, LLC, et al., the plaintiff brought a putative class action alleging that the defendants violated the TCPA by sending her unsolicited text messages. The parties each moved for summary judgment. The plaintiff argued that the texting platform was, as a matter of law, an ATDS. The defendants argued that the web-based texting platform at issue did not meet the statutory definition of an ATDS because it cannot send text messages without human intervention. Continue reading   »

Defendant in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC Asks Ninth Circuit for Rehearing En Banc

As we previously reported here, the court in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, No. 14-56834, 2018 WL 4495553 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 2018) recently expanded the definition of “automatic telephone dialing system,” at least within the Ninth Circuit. And in response, the FCC issued a Public Notice just last week (covered here) seeking further comment on how to interpret the ATDS definition in light of Marks. The comment period closes on October 24, 2018. Continue reading   »

FCC Seeks Further Comment on the Definition of an ATDS Following the Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC

On October 3, 2018, the FCC issued a Public Notice requesting further comment on “what constitutes an automatic telephone dialing system” under the terms of the TCPA in light of the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, No. 14-56834, 2018 WL 4495553 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 2018). Continue reading   »

Save the Date! Drinker Biddle’s TCPA Team to Host TCPA Conference on November 14th

Please join our TCPA Team and distinguished panelists in our Washington, D.C. office on the afternoon of November 14th to discuss the evolving regulatory landscape, best practices for mitigating risk, and strategies for defending suits brought under the TCPA.  The FCC regulations that added fuel to the TCPA fire—and, perhaps not coincidentally, this blog—will soon enjoy their fifth anniversary. And yet class actions and compliance questions continue to mount. Our experienced regulatory and class action counsel will discuss these and other important issues with a number of special guests, including:

  • Peggy Daley, Berkley Research Group
  • Robert DeWitte, Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC
  • Mary Ellen Kleiman, National Association of Chain Drug Stores
  • William Maxson, Federal Trade Commission
  • Joseph Wender, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of U.S. Sen. Edward J. Markey
  • Hassan Zavareei, Tycko & Zavareei LLP

CLE credits will be available and a cocktail reception will be held after the conference. If you would like to attend, please contact us at TCPAteam@dbr.com.

 

District Court Holds Article III Standing Allegation Not Required to Remove

As we have frequently discussed, Article III standing is a recurring issue in TCPA cases. The Southern District of Florida recently added to the precedent in this area when it denied a plaintiff’s motion to remand, holding that defendants did not need to concede plaintiff’s Article III standing in their notice of removal. Gonzalez v. TCR Sports Broadcasting Holding, LLP, No. 18-cv-20048, 2018 WL 4292018 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2018). Continue reading   »

Ninth Circuit Heats Up TCPA Debate With Broad Autodialer Take

As discussed here on the Blog, the Ninth Circuit ruled last Friday in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC that equipment need not have the capacity to dial numbers randomly or sequentially to be an ATDS under the TCPA. Rather, according to the Ninth Circuit, it is sufficient for equipment to have the capacity “to store numbers to be called . . . and to dial such numbers automatically (even if the system must be turned on or triggered by a person)” to be an ATDS.

Law360 also published an article addressing the impact of the decision entitled “Ninth Circuit Heats Up TCPA Debate With Broad Autodialer Take,” and TCPA Blog contributor Justin Kay was quoted in the article. Continue reading   »