If you had not noticed, the fall election campaign season is in full swing. The FCC’s Enforcement Bureau certainly has noticed, and reacted by releasing an unusual “Enforcement Advisory” this week, reminding campaigns and campaign promoters that there are TCPA limits on permissible uses of prerecorded voice message and autodialed calls in election campaigns. Restrictions on acceptable modes of communication vary depending upon whether a campaign or campaign promoter is delivering a call to a residential landline phone or a cell phone, which can be difficult to tell if a phone number has been recycled. Nevertheless, the Enforcement Advisory highlights a $2.9 million proposed fine levied against Dialing Services, LLC earlier this year for its alleged infractions of FCC requirements and warns all entities engaged in campaign calling and texting that they ignore FCC rules and restrictions at their peril of becoming subject to possible FCC enforcement scrutiny and fines. Fines for violations can go as high as $16,000 per violation, which is computed by call or text rather than by telemarketing campaign found to be impermissible by the Enforcement Bureau. While courts are the favored venue of the plaintiffs’ bar for seeking damages, the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau is aggressively staking out its own regulatory turf as the gubernatorial and congressional campaigns use as many tools as possible to galvanize potential voters.
In a TCPA action involving allegedly unsolicited fax advertisements, the Northern District of Illinois applied the plausibility standard articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) to affirmative defenses. See Mussat v. Power Liens, LLC, No. 13-7853, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141561 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2014). We recently discussed a similar TCPA case where the court held that the plausibility standard did not apply, and in doing so sided with the majority view that the textual differences between Rule 8(a)(2) (claims) and Rules 8(b)(1)(A) (defenses) and 8(c)(1) (affirmative defenses) prevented the application of the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses. See Exclusively Cats Veterinary Hospital, P.C. v. Pharmaceutical Credit Corp., No. 13-14376, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132440 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2014). Perhaps because the defendant focused elsewhere in its briefing, the Mussat court simply cited a 25-year-old decision from the Seventh Circuit holding that courts can strike affirmative defenses that do not satisfy federal pleading standards and then recited the requirements of the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard. Mussat, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141561 at *2.
We have discussed several TCPA mootness decisions, mainly those coming out of the federal courts in Florida. Those cases hold that plaintiffs should not file “placeholder” class certification motions solely for the purpose of thwarting an attempted Rule 68 offer of judgment “pick-off.” We now turn our attention to the Southern District of New York, which recently found a TCPA plaintiff’s claim mooted by an offer of judgment made after the plaintiff’s “placeholder” motion for class certification was filed and before that motion was ruled upon.
As we previously reported, on July 17, 2014, the FCC filed a letter brief in Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, Inc. v. Sarris, No. 13-14013 (11th Cir.) (“Sarris”), in which it took the position that entities can be held directly liable under the TCPA whenever their products or services are advertised in an unsolicited fax—even if they did not actually send the fax, and even if they did not know the fax was going to be sent. The FCC’s letter brief stood in marked contrast to its decision last year in In re Joint Petition Filed by Dish Network, LLC, 28 F.C.C. Rcd. 6574 (2013) (“Dish Network”), where the FCC had limited direct liability to only “telemarketers” that “initiate” calls, and otherwise applied agency principles to determine whether “sellers” might be vicariously liable for calls made on their behalf. As readers may recall, the FCC’s letter brief does not articulate a policy reason why a “seller” in the voice call context should receive more protection than an entity whose goods and services are promoted through a fax advertisement. But whatever the merits of the letter brief, it has yet to be cited by the Eleventh Circuit (which has heard argument but not yet issued an opinion) or, at least for the past few months, any other court.
Judge Kathleen M. Williams of the Southern District of Florida handed GEICO a decisive victory on September 29, 2014, when she denied a renewed motion to certify a class of individuals who purportedly received robo-calls from GEICO because she found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient proof of numerosity.
In an unpublished, per curiam decision, the Eighth Circuit recently reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of a defendant and directed the district court to address whether the plaintiff had revoked his consent to being called on his cell phone. Brenner v. Am. Ed. Servs., No. 14-1340, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18416 (8th Cir. Sept. 26, 2014).
In a TCPA action concerning allegedly unsolicited fax advertisements, the Eastern District of Michigan recently rejected the argument that the plausibility standard articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) applies to affirmative defenses. See Exclusively Cats Veterinary Hospital, P.C. v. Pharmaceutical Credit Corp., No. 13-14376, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132440 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2014).
This week the Eleventh Circuit held that a debt collector had “prior express consent” from a debtor whose wife had provided his wireless number on a hospital admission form. Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., No. 13-14008, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18554 (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 2014). In doing so, it reversed an outlier decision from the Southern District of Florida, adopted arguments that the FCC had made in an amicus brief late last year, and provided persuasive precedent on the “prior express consent” exception.