Category - "Revocation"

Maryland District Court Opinion Explores Complexities of TCPA Consent and Revocation

In the recent opinion of Smith v. ExamWorks, LLC, No. 21-2746, 2024 WL 622102 (D. Md. 2024), the District of Maryland analyzed the nuances of consent and revocation under the TCPA.

At the heart of the dispute was whether Plaintiff Smith had expressly consented to receive automated calls, and, if so, whether he had effectively revoked this consent. ExamWorks, seeking summary judgment, argued that consent obtained by Plaintiff’s insurer extended to it, as ExamWorks was conducting an independent medical examination (IME) related to Smith’s insurance claim. The company posited that since Smith had allegedly provided his cellphone number during the claim process, this constituted prior express consent, negating any TCPA violation.

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More TCPA Calling and Texting Restrictions Proposed by the FCC

At the Federal Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) June 8 Open Meeting, the Commissioners voted to adopt a new Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“Notice”) designed to clarify and expand upon the ability of consumers to decide what calls or texts subject to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) they wish to receive.  The Notice addresses pending but unresolved petitions for declaratory rulings filed by a range of entities seeking clarification of a variety of TCPA policies.  The Notice also highlights the agency’s intention to adopt specific rules codifying stated FCC policies contained in prior orders so that consumer rights are “clear” and easy to understand.  Each of the areas addressed by the Notice could affect the compliance programs of callers and texters, and the Notice thus represents an opportunity to inform the FCC of practical consequences of its proposals before it acts to adopt new rules.

Revocation of Consent in “Any Reasonable Way”

In its 2015 Declaratory Ruling, the FCC stated that consumers who had provided prior express consent to receive autodialed or pre-recorded voice calls are free to revoke that consent through any reasonable means of notification to the calling or texting party.  The Notice proposes to formally adopt a rule incorporating that flexibility and prohibiting calling or texting parties from designating any exclusive means to revoke consent.  The proposed rule states that reasonable revocation methods “typically” include text messages, voicemail or email to any phone number or email address where the consumer “can reasonably expect” to reach the caller.  The Notice calls out the use of “STOP” as a widely recognized means of revoking consent and proposes that the FCC employ a presumption that such a message, if sent, it is to be treated as a revocation of consent message.  If text initiators do not allow or enable a reply to text function, then the FCC proposes that that entity be required to provide clear and conspicuous disclosure on each text as to how to revoke consent.

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Timing Is Everything in Eleventh Circuit’s Renewed Consent Case

The Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of a student loan servicer and its affiliate, finding that their nearly 2,000 calls did not violate the TCPA because the plaintiff had renewed his consent by submitting an online demographic form. See Lucoff v. Navient Sols., LLC, No. 19-13482, 2020 WL 7090315 (11th Cir. Dec. 4, 2020).

The history of this case is somewhat winding. In 2010, the plaintiff was part of a class action against one of the defendants. Id. at *1. As part of the settlement terms, class members who did not submit revocation request forms were deemed to have provided prior express consent to receive calls regarding their student loans. Id. The plaintiff did not submit a revocation request. Id.

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Court Enters Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff, Finds No Triable Issues Regarding Revocation of Consent

The Eastern District of California recently entered summary judgment against a plaintiff because it found that the plaintiff failed to revoke his consent to receive auto-dialed calls on his cell phone.  Wright v. USAA Savings Bank, No. 19-0591, 2020 WL 2615441, at *1-5 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2020).  The case illustrates that defendants in the Ninth Circuit can still prevail on consent and other issues even though they may face an uphill battle on ATDS issues.

The plaintiff in Wright applied for a credit card and listed his cell phone number on the application.  Id. at *1. He developed terminal cancer in 2018 and failed to make payments on the credit card.  Id. Between July 2018 and January 2019, defendants’ agent called Mr. Wright’s cellphone number using the Aspect Dialing System to collect the credit card debt. Id. Evidence established that the Aspect Dialing System is a predictive dialer that does not have and is not capable of using a random or sequential number generator to dial numbers. Id.

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11th Circuit Holds that Consumers Cannot Unilaterally Revoke Contractual Consent to Automated Calls

The Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling that a defendant’s calls did not violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) because consumers cannot unilaterally revoke consent that was part of a bilateral contract.

In Medley v. Dish Network, LLC, No. 18-13841, 2020 WL 2092594 (11th Cir. May 1, 2020), Medley entered a two-year contract with DISH for satellite television services. As part of the service contract, Medley provided her cell phone number to DISH and expressly authorized DISH “‘to contact [her] regarding [her] DISH Network account or to recover any unpaid portion of [her] obligation to DISH, through an automated or predictive dialing system or prerecorded messaging system.’” Medley, 2020 WL 2092594, at *1. Approximately eleven months later, Medley temporarily suspended her service under an optional provision of the contract, which triggered a $5.00 monthly fee in lieu of service charges. Medley then underwent bankruptcy, which discharged approximately $800 that she owed to DISH. Following this discharge, DISH called Medley to recover outstanding fees accrued as a result of her temporary pause in service. In response to emails from DISH, Medley’s bankruptcy lawyer sent DISH faxes stating that the lawyer represented Medley with regard to her debts.  DISH continued to contact Medley following these faxes.

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Central District of California Grants Motion for Summary Judgment After Finding That Plaintiff Failed to Revoke Prior Express Consent To Be Called

The Central District of California recently granted summary judgment to the defendant on a TCPA claim in Mendoza v. Allied Interstate LLC, SACV 17-885 JVS (KESx), 2019 WL 5616961 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2019), finding that the plaintiff had not sufficiently proven revocation of consent to be called about two credit card accounts when he had revoked consent to be called about two other accounts serviced by the same card issuer.

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TCPA Class Allegations Stricken Due to “Unique Defenses Peculiar to Plaintiff’s Case”

The Northern District of Illinois recently clarified that a “revocation class” that defines a putative class as those having made “a request to stop calling [their] number” does not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. This memorandum opinion again highlights the significance of individualized issues of consent in a TCPA class certification process. Continue reading “TCPA Class Allegations Stricken Due to “Unique Defenses Peculiar to Plaintiff’s Case””

Inadmissible Hearsay Will Not Create Genuine Issue of Fact Regarding Whether Plaintiff Revoked Consent

The Southern District of Texas recently entered summary judgment in favor of a TCPA defendant, holding that the plaintiff had failed to present competent proof that she had orally revoked her consent to be called by a collection agency. Young v. Medicredit Inc., No. 17-3701, 2019 WL 1923457, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2019). Continue reading “Inadmissible Hearsay Will Not Create Genuine Issue of Fact Regarding Whether Plaintiff Revoked Consent”

Trial Courts Split On Whether Consumers Can Unilaterally Revoke Contractual Consent

As we discussed last year, the Second Circuit has held that consumers cannot unilaterally revoke consent that was provided as part of a bilateral contract. See Reyes v. Lincoln Automotive Fin. Servs., 861 F.3d 51 (2017). In doing so, it explained that it is “black letter law” that a “party may not alter a bilateral
contract . . . without the consent of a counterparty,” and that nothing in the TCPA purports to “permit a consumer to revoke his consent to be called when that consent forms part of a bargained-for exchange.” Although this seemingly straightforward statement is now settled within the Second Circuit, see, e.g., Harris v. Navient Solutions, LLC, No. 15-0546, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140317 (D. Conn. Aug. 7, 2018), it remains unsettled elsewhere. Continue reading “Trial Courts Split On Whether Consumers Can Unilaterally Revoke Contractual Consent”

Court Denies Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motion, Cites Factual Dispute Regarding Whether Plaintiff Revoked Consent

The Eastern District of Michigan recently denied a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because the defendant raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiff had revoked his consent to receive the challenged calls. See Mayang v. PAR Grp., Inc., No. 17-12447, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118784 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2018). Continue reading “Court Denies Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motion, Cites Factual Dispute Regarding Whether Plaintiff Revoked Consent”