A federal district court recently rejected a plaintiff’s bid at class certification in a TCPA case. See Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. ACT, Inc., No. CV 12-40088-TSH, 2018 WL 5281746 (D. Mass. Oct. 24, 2018) (available here). The decision provides a useful illustration of how individualized issues of consent may defeat a plaintiff’s attempt to show that common questions “predominate,” as required by Rule 23(b)(3). Continue reading
We previously described the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Marks v. Crunch San Diego which, contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s ACA International ruling in March of this year, treated the definition of an ATDS expansively, holding that that statutory definition of an ATDS includes equipment that has the capacity (1) to store numbers to be called or (2) to produce numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. We explained how the Ninth Circuit’s decision represented an improper interpretation of the ATDS statutory language. And we previously reported how the FCC sought expedited public comment on the Marks decision. Continue reading
As a follow-up to our initial reminder to mark your calendars for our half-day conference on November 14, 2018, in Washington, D.C., we are pleased to share the agenda.
Distinguished panelists hailing from government, retail, finance, health, and technology will join Drinker Biddle attorneys for an afternoon of discussion about the past, present and future of the TCPA and related litigation and enforcement.
We hope to see you there!
Recently, the Eastern District of Michigan granted a motion for summary judgment in Gary v. Trueblue, Inc., No. 17-10544, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175021 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 11, 2018), after finding that a plaintiff failed to show that defendants’ telephone dialing system qualified as an ATDS under the statute’s plain language. This decision adds to the growing list of cases applying the plain language of the statute in the wake of ACA International. Continue reading
On Tuesday last week, we noted that as we approach the November 2018 midterm elections, we expect to see an uptick in the number of TCPA lawsuits filed against campaigns, candidates, and committees. On cue, on Friday two new such putative class action TCPA lawsuits were filed: Norton v. 1863 PAC, Ltd., No. 18cv173 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 19, 2018) and Syed v. Beto for Texas, No. 18cv2791 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2018). Continue reading
Two courts recently examined whether professional plaintiffs had standing to assert TCPA claims. Their decisions betray a continuing confusion concerning what it is that gives plaintiffs—particularly serial plaintiffs—standing to sue. See Cunningham v. Florio, No. 17-0839, 2018 WL 4473792 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2018); Morris v. Hornet Corp., No. 17-0350, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170945 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2018). Continue reading
As we approach the November 2018 midterm elections, we expect that we will once again see (i) an uptick in the volume of political calls; (ii) a reminder from the FCC that the TCPA applies to those calls (emphasizing that such calls are prohibited if made to cell phones without the consent of the called party, and that all prerecorded calls to cell phones or landlines must comply with certain identification and line release requirements); and (iii) a handful of new lawsuits filed against campaigns, candidates, and committees that allegedly failed to heed the FCC’s warning—all topics we have covered here before. Two recent decisions from a federal court in West Virginia pertaining to the 2016 election serve as a reminder that these lawsuits can linger long after the election ends
A new case out of Indiana, Sanford v. Navient Solutions, LLC, 2018 WL 4699890 (S.D. IN Oct. 01, 2018), underscores the importance of delving into the details of the FCC materials on which plaintiffs rely to support their claims.
In Sanford, relatively straightforward allegations—the defendant’s continued use of autodialed calls after the plaintiff revoked consent—were complicated by the fact that the federal government owned the debt at issue in the calls. The TCPA prohibits “mak[ing] any call (other than a call made for emergency purpose or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice” to “a cellular telephone service . . . unless such call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). Continue reading
A federal district court in the Southern District of Florida joined a list of courts that have found a web-based text messaging platform to fall outside the purview of the TCPA due to the amount of human intervention required to send a text message. In Ramos v. Hopele of Fort Lauderdale, LLC, et al., the plaintiff brought a putative class action alleging that the defendants violated the TCPA by sending her unsolicited text messages. The parties each moved for summary judgment. The plaintiff argued that the texting platform was, as a matter of law, an ATDS. The defendants argued that the web-based texting platform at issue did not meet the statutory definition of an ATDS because it cannot send text messages without human intervention. Continue reading
As we previously reported here, the court in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, No. 14-56834, 2018 WL 4495553 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 2018) recently expanded the definition of “automatic telephone dialing system,” at least within the Ninth Circuit. And in response, the FCC issued a Public Notice just last week (covered here) seeking further comment on how to interpret the ATDS definition in light of Marks. The comment period closes on October 24, 2018. Continue reading