On Wednesday the Joint Petitioners and the FCC filed their final briefs in the consolidated appeal from the FCC’s July 10, 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order, which is pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Their briefs are summarized below.
The Joint Petitioners’ Final Brief
The Joint Petitioners’ final brief reiterates their primary challenges to the FCC’s rulings regarding the definition of an ATDS, the identity of the “called party” from which consent must be obtained, and the extent of that party’s ability to revoke that consent. Continue reading
The Sixth Circuit recently affirmed the entry of summary judgment against plaintiffs who had not given their phone numbers to the debt collector that had called them or to the creditor to which they owed money. See Baisden v. Credit Adjustments, Inc., No. 15-3411, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2465 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 2016). In doing so, it agreed with the FCC and the Eleventh Circuit that “prior express consent” can be “obtained and conveyed via intermediaries,” in this case the hospital to which the plaintiffs had voluntarily given their numbers.
The plaintiffs were former patients at a hospital (Mount Carmel Hospital) who owed debts that were transferred from an affiliated anesthesiology practice (Consultant Anesthesiologists) to a debt collector (Credit Adjustments, Inc.). Both of the plaintiffs had signed admission forms that permitted the hospital to release their “health information” to third parties for purposes of “billing and payment” or “billing and collecting monies due,” among other things. Id. at *2-6. After the plaintiffs received calls from the debt collector regarding their debts, they filed a putative class action against the debt collector, the anesthesiology practice, and the hospital. Continue reading
The FCC’s Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau has issued a public notice seeking comment on a December 11, 2015 petition by Lifetime Entertainment Services, LLC (“Lifetime”). The petition asked the FCC to clarify that the TCPA’s limitations on prerecorded calls do not apply to calls by cable operators and networks that merely inform subscribers about content that they are already entitled to watch. In the alternative, Lifetime sought a grant of retroactive waiver for a call that it had allegedly placed to inform subscribers that a reality television program had moved to Lifetime, and was accordingly available under the subscriber’s current plan. Lifetime argued that, because it was not urging the subscriber to make a new purchase, and indeed, provided no information on how to make any purchase, the call should be viewed as informational, not telemarketing. In support of this conclusion, Lifetime cited Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. Medco Health Solutions, which deemed informational several faxes that were “not sent with hopes to make a profit.” 788 F.3d 218, 221 (6th Cir. 2015). The FCC has set the deadlines for comments and reply comments on this petition at March 7, 2016 and March 21, 2016, respectively.
In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the named plaintiff in a putative TCPA class action expressly consented to receive a text message when she provided an airline with her phone number, even though she claimed she only provided her number because she thought it was required to purchase airline tickets and had no intention of consenting to be contacted. Baird v. Sabre, Inc., No. 14-55293, 2016 WL 424778, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2016).
When Shaya Baird booked flights online, she was prompted to provide contact information and was informed that “‘[a]t least one phone number is required.’” Baird v. Sabre, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Three weeks later, Sabre, which was contracted by Hawaiian Airlines to provide traveler notification services, sent Baird a text message asking if she wanted to receive flight notifications. Baird did not respond and Sabre sent no other messages. Baird subsequently filed a putative class action. Continue reading
On February 16th, the joint Petitioners, supporting Intervenors, and Rite Aid Hdqrtrs. Corp. (“Rite Aid”) each filed a reply brief in support of the consolidated appeal of the FCC’s July 10, 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order. Each brief addresses the deficiencies of the FCC’s response filed on January 15th, which was first reported here. The main arguments are summarized below. Continue reading
In its October 2014 Final Order (the “Anda Order”), the Federal Communications Commission found that it had the statutory authority to regulate solicited faxes by promulgating a rule that requires an opt-out notice on all such faxes, but also found that because of reasonable confusion surrounding the regulation, there was good cause to waive the rule for fax senders who had previously sent solicited faxes without the opt-out notice. Continue reading
As the defense bar’s preeminent public resource on TCPA litigation and regulation, TCPA Blog has been invited to contribute a regular column to Law360. In the first such column, Bradley Andreozzi, Michael Daly, and Justin Kay discuss how the FCC’s interpretations of the TCPA violate the First Amendment rights. They write:
For an agency charged with regulating communications, the Federal Communications Commission has shown itself to be remarkably indifferent to First Amendment rights. In its recent brief in the consolidated appeal from its July 2015 omnibus ruling on the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, the FCC blandly assured the D.C. Circuit that “[e]very court” has held that the TCPA’s restrictions “easily pass muster under the First Amendment.” FCC Brief at 73-74. But it all but ignored that, rather than “directly challenge the TCPA’s constitutionality,” the petitioners in that appeal challenge the FCC’s “interpretations of the statute.” Id. at 72-73. On that issue, the D.C. Circuit will be writing on a clean slate, and the First Amendment challenges are serious.
They then highlight three serious First Amendment concerns, specifically that the FCC’s: (1) healthcare exemption restricts necessary speech; (2) recycled numbers ruling demands the impossible; and (3) ATDS interpretation is unconstitutionally vague.
Click here to read the full article.