We’ve previously reported on the D.C. Circuit’s March 31 decision, which held that “the FCC’s 2006 Solicited Fax Rule is . . . unlawful to the extent that it requires opt-out notices on solicited faxes.” Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. FCC, No. 14-1234, Slip. Op. at 4 (D.C. Cir. 2017). And as we recently discussed, the plaintiff intervenors in that case have sought a rehearing en banc. Given the significance of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in TCPA class actions, it would not be a surprise if the en banc petition is just the beginning of the plaintiffs’ bar’s efforts to attack the D.C. Circuit’s decision. While the D.C. Circuit’s ruling is welcome news to defendants in TCPA actions, the Eastern District of Missouri recently dealt another blow to the plaintiffs’ bar. In that regard, shortly before the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, a district court held that an allegedly deficient opt-out notice in a fax the plaintiff invited did not give rise to a concrete injury under Spokeo, and dismissed the case for lack of Article III standing. St. Louis Heart Ctr., Inc. v. Nomax, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-517 RLW, 2017 U,S., Dist, LEXIS 39411 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2017). Continue reading
We’ve previously discussed First Amendment challenges to the TCPA and state law counterparts in the context of political speech here, here, and here. Recently, the Seventh Circuit rejected a nonprofit group’s argument that Indiana’s anti-robocall statute violated the First Amendment because it did not exempt robocalls involving political speech. Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Zoller, No. 16-2059, 2017 U.S.App. LEXIS 47 (Jan. 3, 2017). Continue reading
In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the named plaintiff in a putative TCPA class action expressly consented to receive a text message when she provided an airline with her phone number, even though she claimed she only provided her number because she thought it was required to purchase airline tickets and had no intention of consenting to be contacted. Baird v. Sabre, Inc., No. 14-55293, 2016 WL 424778, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2016).
When Shaya Baird booked flights online, she was prompted to provide contact information and was informed that “‘[a]t least one phone number is required.’” Baird v. Sabre, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Three weeks later, Sabre, which was contracted by Hawaiian Airlines to provide traveler notification services, sent Baird a text message asking if she wanted to receive flight notifications. Baird did not respond and Sabre sent no other messages. Baird subsequently filed a putative class action. Continue reading
On January 20, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a long-awaited ruling in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez. Although their reasoning differed, six of the Justices held that an unaccepted offer of complete relief does not in and of itself deprive a court of Article III jurisdiction by mooting a plaintiff’s claim. Continue reading
We’ve been watching closely as the various Circuit Courts of Appeals grapple with whether a Rule 68 offer of judgment to the named plaintiff in a putative class action can render the case moot even if the plaintiff rejects the offer and wants to keep litigating. As we noted in a previous post, the U.S. Supreme Court is set to resolve the issue soon.
In a recent Southern District of Texas decision, Cantu v. Platinum Mktg. Group, Case No. 1:14-CV-71, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90824 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 13, 2015), plaintiff Hector Cantu brought suit against defendant Platinum Marketing Group LLC d/b/a/ DiabetesHelpNow.com, LLC (“Platinum”) for calls made to his cell phone in violation of the TCPA. In considering Cantu’s motion for entry of default judgment, the court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
As we noted a few months ago, several pending Circuit appeals and a pending petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court foreshadowed that clarity might be coming to the question whether an offer of complete relief to a named plaintiff in a putative class action can moot the named plaintiff’s claim, and the related issue of whether named plaintiffs can continue to pursue claims on behalf of a putative class after their individual claims become moot. Last week the Second Circuit has provided a partial answer, and today the Supreme Court granted certiorari, which hopefully will put the issue to rest once and for all.
The new year is off to a busy start, and it appears 2015 will bring additional Circuit-level clarity to an issue the Supreme Court left open in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013): whether an offer of complete relief to a named plaintiff in a putative class action moots the named plaintiff’s claim. The resolution of that issue, and the related question whether named plaintiffs can continue to pursue claims on behalf of a putative class after their individual claims become moot, will have a major impact on class action litigation, particularly in cases that seek statutory damages such as those available under the TCPA.
A federal district court in California recently ruled that a consumer who voluntarily provided a cellphone number in order to complete an online purchase gave “prior express consent” to receive a text message from the business’s vendors under the TCPA. See Baird v. Sabre, Inc., No. CV 13-999 SVW, 2014 WL 320205 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014).
The Second Circuit recently held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs whether TCPA class actions can proceed in New York federal courts, and concluded that a prior Second Circuit ruling to the contrary no longer was good law. Bank v. Independence Energy Group LLC, No. 13-1746-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 3, 2013).
Previously, in Bonime v. Avaya, Inc., 547 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit had held that state procedural rules governed whether a TCPA action could proceed as a class action in federal court, instead of Rule 23. Because N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) bars class actions seeking statutory damages unless the statute at issue expressly authorizes recovery in a class action (which the TCPA does not), the Bonime court ruled that a TCPA plaintiff could not pursue a class action for statutory damages in New York federal courts. This effectively sounded the death knell for TCPA class actions in New York.