Nearly three years ago, in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, the Supreme Court held that claims are not mooted by unaccepted offers of complete relief under Rule 68 because they create neither an “obligation” to provide nor an “entitlement” to receive any relief. But the Court expressly left open the possibility that depositing the full amount of a plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff might be enough. Continue reading
After the Supreme Court held in Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez that merely offering to make a payment will not moot a claim, we predicted that defendants would explore various procedural mechanisms for arguing that actually making a payment will moot a plaintiff’s claim. Indeed, although the Supreme Court did not reach the issue, its decision strongly suggested that plaintiffs who have received complete relief—as opposed a mere offer of complete relief—no longer have live cases or controversies as required by Article III. See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (Feb. 9, 2016) (“We need not, and do not, now decide whether the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.”). This week, however, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that not even tendering funds into a court-monitored interest-bearing account is enough to moot a claim. See Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574 (June 20, 2017). What, if anything, would be enough it did not say. Continue reading
On November 7, 2016, a Southern District of Florida court sua sponte declined to exercise its supplemental authority and dismissed a plaintiff’s state law claims in a TCPA action. In Travis v. Residential Credit Solutions, Inc., the plaintiff alleges that defendant placed hundreds of calls to his cellular phone using an ATDS in an effort to collect a debt. From these allegations, the plaintiff filed an individual complaint consisting of three claims: two claims asserting violations of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”) and one claim asserting a violation of the TCPA. Continue reading
The Second Circuit last week confirmed that entries of judgment satisfying an individual plaintiff’s claims moot TCPA class actions.
In Bank v. Alliance Health Networks, LLC, No. 15-cv-4037 (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 2016), the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the class claims after an entry of judgment, pursuant to the defendants’ offer of judgment, rendered the class claims moot. The Second Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court held in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) that an unaccepted offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff’s claims. “But where judgment has been entered and where the plaintiff’s claims have been satisfied, as they were here when [the plaintiff] negotiated the check, any individual claims are rendered moot.” Continue reading
The Middle District of Florida recently entered summary judgment in favor of a school board, reasoning that it is not a “person” that is subject to suit under the TCPA. See Lambert v. Seminole Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 15-0078 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2016). The decision creates a potentially insurmountable obstacle for plaintiffs who have taken to setting their sights on school districts and other well intentioned government actors.
In Lambert, the defendant allegedly made 537 calls to the plaintiff’s cellphone shortly after he received a reassigned number. The calls used prerecorded voice prompts and messages that were meant to communicate with prospective substitute teachers, to whom the school district had issued five-digit identification codes. The plaintiff alleged that he was not the intended recipient of the calls and that he neither worked as a substitute teacher nor received an identification code. Continue reading
On January 20, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a long-awaited ruling in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez. Although their reasoning differed, six of the Justices held that an unaccepted offer of complete relief does not in and of itself deprive a court of Article III jurisdiction by mooting a plaintiff’s claim. Continue reading
In a recent Southern District of Texas decision, Cantu v. Platinum Mktg. Group, Case No. 1:14-CV-71, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90824 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 13, 2015), plaintiff Hector Cantu brought suit against defendant Platinum Marketing Group LLC d/b/a/ DiabetesHelpNow.com, LLC (“Platinum”) for calls made to his cell phone in violation of the TCPA. In considering Cantu’s motion for entry of default judgment, the court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Appropriate application of the Administrative Orders Review Act (aka the Hobbs Act) can become a contentious issue in some TCPA cases, and in this post we highlight a few recent examples. The Hobbs Act provides exclusive jurisdiction to the federal court of appeals to determine the validity of all final orders of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and also specifies that any party aggrieved by a final order of an agency such as the FCC may file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals with appropriate venue within 60 days after its entry. Thus, while plaintiffs in TCPA cases may allege that aspects of the TCPA laws or FCC rules have been violated, they are not free to collaterally attack the substance of FCC rules that they have not timely challenged. The FCC is understandably concerned when plaintiffs mount an indirect challenge of the agency’s rules, in some cases so much so that the agency participates in a court proceeding.