The Middle District of Florida recently denied class certification because the plaintiff failed to prove that consent (or more to the point, an alleged lack of consent) could be established on a classwide basis. In doing so, it confirmed that class action plaintiffs have the burden of proving that issues are susceptible to classwide proof even though a defendant may bear the burden of proving or disproving some of those issues at trial. See Shamblin v. Obama for Am., No. 13-2428, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54849 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2015).
Northern District of Illinois Applies Twombly/Iqbal Pleading Standard to Affirmative Defenses in TCPA Case
In a TCPA action involving allegedly unsolicited fax advertisements, the Northern District of Illinois applied the plausibility standard articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) to affirmative defenses. See Mussat v. Power Liens, LLC, No. 13-7853, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141561 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2014). We recently discussed a similar TCPA case where the court held that the plausibility standard did not apply, and in doing so sided with the majority view that the textual differences between Rule 8(a)(2) (claims) and Rules 8(b)(1)(A) (defenses) and 8(c)(1) (affirmative defenses) prevented the application of the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses. See Exclusively Cats Veterinary Hospital, P.C. v. Pharmaceutical Credit Corp., No. 13-14376, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132440 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2014). Perhaps because the defendant focused elsewhere in its briefing, the Mussat court simply cited a 25-year-old decision from the Seventh Circuit holding that courts can strike affirmative defenses that do not satisfy federal pleading standards and then recited the requirements of the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard. Mussat, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141561 at *2.
Court Holds That Twombly/Iqbal Pleading Standard Does Not Apply to Affirmative Defenses in TCPA Case
In a TCPA action concerning allegedly unsolicited fax advertisements, the Eastern District of Michigan recently rejected the argument that the plausibility standard articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) applies to affirmative defenses. See Exclusively Cats Veterinary Hospital, P.C. v. Pharmaceutical Credit Corp., No. 13-14376, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132440 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2014).
Eleventh Circuit Holds That Debt Collector Had “Prior Express Consent” From Debtor Whose Wife Provided Number on Hospital Admission Form
This week the Eleventh Circuit held that a debt collector had “prior express consent” from a debtor whose wife had provided his wireless number on a hospital admission form. Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., No. 13-14008, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18554 (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 2014). In doing so, it reversed an outlier decision from the Southern District of Florida, adopted arguments that the FCC had made in an amicus brief late last year, and provided persuasive precedent on the “prior express consent” exception.
State Courts Disagree About Whether Statutory Damages Make Class Actions an Inferior Method for Adjudicating TCPA Claims
The statutory damages that have caused so many plaintiffs to file TCPA class actions have also caused some courts to find that class actions are not the superior method for adjudicating them. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) requires not only that common questions predominate over individual ones, but also that “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Whether a class action is the superior method for adjudication depends on a number of stated and unstated considerations, among them “the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A). As we have noted before, some courts have held that TCPA claims are categorically unfit for class treatment because $500-$1,500 plus attorneys’ fees and costs is adequate to incent individuals to file claims, is disproportionate to any actual damages, and is potentially ruinous if aggregated in a class action. Two state courts recently addressed this issue and reached contrary conclusions.
Court Lets Debt-Collector Amend Answer and Assert Counterclaim for Plaintiff’s Debt
In a TCPA class action case concerning debt collection calls, the Southern District of California recently granted a debt-collector defendant’s motion to file an amended answer and assert a counterclaim for breach of contract arising from the plaintiff’s approximately $22,000 debt for the purchase of a used vehicle. See Horton v. Calvary Portfolio Servs., LLC, No. 13-cv-0307, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102569 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 2014).
Court Lets Plaintiff Revive Mooted Claims In Second Action Against Same Defendants
The Eastern District of New York recently denied a motion to dismiss and found that the plaintiff’s claims were not precluded by a different court’s ruling that the same claims against the same defendants had been mooted by an offer of judgment. See Bank v. Spark Energy Holdings, No. 13-6130, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84493 (E.D.N.Y. June 20, 2014); Bank v. Spark Energy Holdings, No. 11-4082, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150733 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2013).
FCC Denies Petition To Change Its Rules So That It Could Preside Over Class Actions
The FCC recently denied a petition that had asked it to amend its rules so that it could preside over class actions. Although the Petition did not mention the TCPA, it would not have taken long for plaintiffs to create a new front of TCPA litigation had the Petition had been granted.
Court Dismisses TCPA Action Because Plaintiff Refused to Plead Her Telephone Number
On April 17, Judge Robert Bell of the Western District of Michigan found that a plaintiff does not state a claim under the TCPA if she does not plead the telephone number at which she allegedly had been called. See Strand v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., No. 13-1235, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 52963 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 17, 2014). The decision is a welcome one for defendants who have encountered counsel who only disclose a plaintiff’s telephone number as part of reciprocal (and inevitably asymmetrical) discovery.