Paul A. Rosenthal

Paul A. Rosenthal

Paul Rosenthal defends clients in complex commercial litigation, particularly involving consumer marketing, advertising, labeling and data privacy issues. He represents clients in responding to federal and state investigations involving advertising, marketing and privacy, as well as counseling clients on compliance with a wide variety of related state and federal laws. Clients appreciate Paul’s direct, pragmatic approach and ability to find practical legal solutions to complex challenges. Informed by his previous work as in-house counsel for a multinational consumer products company and his eye for efficiency, Paul assesses risks and opportunities to leverage the law to achieve business objectives. Paul defends his clients in single-plaintiff, class action, and consolidated cases in state and federal court, as well as in arbitration and mediation. He represents public and private companies in contract and indemnification disputes arising out of consumer claims that involve alleged false labeling, improper telemarketing or text marketing practices under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).

View the full bio for Paul A. Rosenthal at the Faegre Drinker website.

Articles by Paul A. Rosenthal:


Fifth Circuit Find’s FCC’s “Prior Express Written Consent” Rule Exceeded Its Statutory Authority

The Fifth Circuit has rejected the FCC rule that has imposed a heightened “prior express written consent” requirement—a requirement found nowhere in the TCPA’s plain language—for more than a decade.  See Bradford v. Sovereign Pest Control of Texas, Inc., No. 24-20379, 2026 WL 520620, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 2026). Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), it found that the “prior express written consent” rule is unenforceable because the FCC had exceeded its statutory authority in enacting it.

From 1991 to 2012 — more than 20 years — it had been the FCC’s consistent position that consent can be “expressed” simply by providing one’s number — i.e., without a “written” or “signed” agreement. See, e.g., In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 FCC Rcd. 8752, ¶ 31 (1992) (“[P]ersons who knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called…”). It was not until 2013 that the FCC reversed course, enacting a rule requiring that consent for certain communication not only be “express” but also that it be “written,” “bear[] the signature of the person called,” and include various and sundry disclosures the FCC deemed desirable. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(f)(9).

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Class Certification Runs Out of Gas Over Consent Questions

The Northern District of Texas recently denied class certification in Rhonn Mitchell v. Toyota of Dallas, a putative class action arising from allegations that Toyota of Dallas (TOD) had violated the TCPA by sending marketing text messages to customers who had previously opted out of such communications. See 2025 WL 3013789 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2025). This case illustrates the teeth of the predominance inquiry and the importance of maintaining consent records, which are significant evidence even when held in varying formats.

Plaintiff Rhonn Mitchell alleged that, after purchasing a used car, he received repeated marketing texts from TOD despite alleging that he had opted out of receiving such messages. Alleging that TOD had sent over 16,000 texts to more than 1,500 customers after they had similarly opted out, Mitchell sought to certify both nationwide and Texas-only classes of consumers.

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District Court Limits the Impact of a “Stop” Text

The Northern District of Illinois recently validated a company’s narrow interpretation for the scope of communications a party opts out of when it revokes consent under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d). In Stamper v. Manus-Northwestern Oral Health Center, Ltd., the court granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss confirming that the plaintiff did not adequately revoke consent to receive all marketing communications from the defendant after replying “stop” to one message instead of “STOPALL” as instructed to cease all communications. 2025 WL 2044093 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2025). For companies with multipronged or multichannel communication streams, this decision provides validation that an opt-out from one category of message or specific campaign need not be read as a bar to all messages.

In Stamper, the plaintiff alleged they had “received texts advertising [defendant]’s services on at least a monthly basis from September 2022 to January 2023, despite repeatedly responding “stop” in an attempt to unsubscribe in the manner the messages instructed.” Id. at 1. The texts included notifications of open appointments, recall messages and reminders that a person was due for an appointment. Some of the texts were addressed to different individuals for whom the plaintiff had provided their number as the point of contact.

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