One of the central issues that was before the D.C. Circuit in ACA International v. FCC was whether the term “called party” refers to the intended or the unintended recipient of a call. In its July 10, 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order, the FCC interpreted the term to be the current “subscriber” on the account to which the phone number is assigned or “the non-subscriber customary user of the phone.” Under this interpretation, businesses that try in good faith to contact consumers who have consented to receive such calls face significant liability with minimal recourse, when those calls reach someone else. The D.C. Circuit set aside the FCC’s “treatment of reassigned numbers as whole,” which includes its interpretation of called party. In light of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, the FCC is currently seeking comment on critical TCPA issues with an eye toward taking a much broader view of the TCPA landscape than it did in its 2015 TCPA Order. In the meantime, one business involved in a TCPA action is seeking indemnification from the consumer it intended to reach in making the calls that form the basis of the TCPA action against it. Continue reading
The District of New Jersey recently dismissed a class action TCPA complaint, finding that the plaintiff did not use a reasonable method of revoking consent when she failed to follow the defendant’s straightforward directions for providing such revocation. Rando v. Edible Arrangements Int’l, LLC, No. 17-0701, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51201 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2018). In doing so, the court’s decision further confirmed the position within the District that the totality of the circumstances dictates whether a method of revocation of consent is reasonable and thus valid in TCPA cases. Continue reading
Multiple district courts have recently examined whether, and in what circumstances, providing one’s phone number suffices to establish consent to be called under the TCPA. The issue is complicated, turning on whether prior express consent must be in writing, a determination which, in turn, requires examination of whether the call in question constitutes “telemarketing” or “advertising.”
As discussed here, the Central District of California recently granted summary judgment in favor of an insurance company after finding that a prerecorded call to the insured’s mobile phone, which reminded her to review her health plan options for the following year, was not telemarketing and therefore did not require “prior express written consent.” See Smith v. Blue Shield of Cal. Life & Health Ins. Co., No. SACV 16-00108-CJC-KES (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2017).
But just a few weeks ago, a different judge in the Central District reached the opposite conclusion in a similar case, and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Flores v. Access Ins. Co., No. 2:15-cv-02883-CAS-AGR (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2017) (available here). These two decisions illustrate how courts continue to grapple with the distinction between “telemarketing” and “informational” calls. Continue reading
On May 9, 2016, the Sixth Circuit reversed a decision of the Northern District of Ohio granting summary judgment to Defendant in a TCPA fax case. Siding & Insulation Co. v. Alco Vending, Inc., No. 15-3551. The district court had accepted Defendant’s argument that it could not be liable under the TCPA for sending the allegedly offending faxes because while it did retain an ad agency (B2B/Caroline Abraham, a combination known well to practitioners in this space) to transmit faxes advertising its services to consenting businesses, it had never authorized transmission of faxes to non-consenting businesses, including the Plaintiff. Finding that under federal common-law agency principles Defendant could not be held vicariously liable for sending the faxes because it neither authorized the transmission of the offending faxes, nor ratified the ad agency’s conduct, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Continue reading
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina recently adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation that summary judgment be entered in favor of a defendant because it had a good faith belief that it had consent to call the plaintiff’s number.
In Danehy v. Time Warner Cable Enterprises, Case No. 14-cv-133 (E.D.N.C.), a pro se plaintiff (“Plaintiff”) alleged that Time Warner violated the TCPA by using an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) to call his cellular phone that was registered on the national do-not-call registry. The phone number at issue had previously belonged to a Time Warner customer who had provided the phone number as a secondary contact for Time Warner to use when he could not be reached at his primary phone number. Time Warner had made calls to, and received calls from, the customer using the number numerous times in the past. The number was eventually assigned to Plaintiff in August or September 2013.