On February 8, 2017, the FCC issued a public notice seeking comment on a petition for rulemaking and declaratory ruling (the “Petition”) filed by Craig Moskowitz and Craig Cunningham (the “Petitioners”). The Petition seeks the initiation of a rulemaking to overturn the FCC’s allegedly “improper interpretation that ‘prior express consent’ includes implied consent resulting from a party’s providing a telephone number to the caller.” Continue reading “FCC Releases Public Notice on Petition to Eliminate Exceptions to Written Consent Requirement”
Central District of California Dismisses TCPA Claims Due to a Lack of Traceability
One of our recent articles discussed how federal courts have analyzed the “traceability” element of Article III in TCPA cases. Specifically, we noted that two federal courts had cited Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016) in dismissing claims because the alleged injuries were not “traceable to” (i.e., caused by) the purported violations. See Ewing v. SQM US Inc., No. 16-1609, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143272 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2016); Romero v. Dep’t Stores Nat’l Bank, No. 15-0193, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110889 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2016). In their view the “violation” was not the act of dialing a number, but rather the act of dialing a number with an ATDS. Because the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries would have been the same if the defendants had dialed their numbers manually, the courts found that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because their alleged injuries were not traceable to the use of an ATDS. Although the cases involved only one or two calls, the courts did not limit their traceability analyses to that context. Nevertheless it remained unclear whether this rigorous approach to traceability would be applied more broadly in other contexts. Continue reading “Central District of California Dismisses TCPA Claims Due to a Lack of Traceability”
Eastern District of Pennsylvania Reaffirms Entry of Summary Judgment in Favor of Yahoo!
On remand from the Third Circuit, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reaffirmed its entry of summary judgment in favor of Yahoo!, holding once again that the company’s email-to-text alert system did not qualify as an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”). Specifically, the court found that “present capacity” was the appropriate standard and declined to apply the “potential capacity” test that a narrow majority of the FCC announced in its July 2015 Declaratory Ruling & Order (“2015 Ruling”). See Dominguez v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 13-1887, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11346, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2017); Rules & Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961 (2015). Continue reading “Eastern District of Pennsylvania Reaffirms Entry of Summary Judgment in Favor of Yahoo!”
The Tide Is Turning: Ajit Pai Chosen To Head FCC
On July 10, 2015, a sharply divided FCC issued a Declaratory Ruling and Order (the “July 2015 Order”) that missed the mark. The July 2015 Order purported to expand the scope of the TCPA through its unsupported redefinition of an “automatic telephone dialing system,” create an untenable one call “safe harbor” for reassigned number liability, and permit parties to revoke consent through any “reasonable” means. The July 2015 Order is presently on appeal in the D.C. Circuit, and there is hope that the Court, which heard argument on October 19, 2016, will undo its pronouncements, which have had broad implications for businesses that place calls and send text messages to consumers for telemarketing or informational purposes. These companies have faced potentially crushing liability through a huge wave of TCPA actions (both proposed class actions and individual claims) as well as pre-suit demands, many of which have been initiated by opportunistic plaintiffs’ lawyers and serial plaintiffs. Continue reading “The Tide Is Turning: Ajit Pai Chosen To Head FCC”
Central District of California Holds That Insurance Renewal Notifications Are Not Telemarketing Under the TCPA
The Central District of California recently granted summary judgment to a health insurer after finding that a pre-recorded message delivered to the insured’s cell phone reminding her to review her health plan options for the coming year was not telemarketing. Smith v. Blue Shield of Cal. Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 16cv108 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2017), ECF No. 73.
In Smith, the plaintiff completed an application for health insurance through California’s Affordable Care Act Healthcare Marketplace, Covered California. As part of that application process, Plaintiff provided her cell phone number as “the best number at which to contact her.” As required by law, the insurance was set to automatically renew for 2016, and in 2015, Blue Shield attempted to contact Smith by sending written materials to her mailing address (as also required by law) to inform her of the changes to her plan and provide her with alternatives. Plaintiff’s materials, however, were returned to Blue Shield as undeliverable. As with other insureds whose materials were returned, Blue Shield followed up with a pre-recorded message stating in relevant part: “This is an important message from Blue Shield of California. It’s time to review your 2016 health plan options and see what’s new. Earlier this month, we mailed you information about your 2016 plan and benefit changes. It compares your current health plan to other options from Blue Shield. You can also find out more online at blueshieldca.com. If you have not received your information packet in the mail, or if you have any questions, please call the number on the back of your member ID card.” Plaintiff received the call on December 3, 2015; on December 6, 2015, she completed an application for a different insurance plan for the 2016 year. Continue reading “Central District of California Holds That Insurance Renewal Notifications Are Not Telemarketing Under the TCPA”
There’s a Ketch: Court Reverses Entry of Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiffs with Muddled Timeline
A recent appellate opinion out of Oklahoma state court provides an important reminder that putative classes should not include people who did not receive the communication at issue. See Ketch v. Royal Windows, 113986 (Ct. Civ. App. Okla., Nov. 08, 2016).
In Ketch, the plaintiff filed suit after receiving an allegedly unsolicited fax advertisement from the defendant, from which it had previously requested a catalog. The defendant admitted that the fax advertisement did not have any opt-out language and evidently did not seek a retroactive waiver from the FCC. The plaintiff then moved for summary judgment on behalf of itself and a previously certified class. The trial court granted that motion, finding that Royal was liable to the tune of $290,000.00, i.e., $500 for each fax that had been transmitted. Continue reading “There’s a Ketch: Court Reverses Entry of Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiffs with Muddled Timeline”
Seventh Circuit Rejects Political Speech Challenge to Indiana’s Anti-Robocall Statute
We’ve previously discussed First Amendment challenges to the TCPA and state law counterparts in the context of political speech here, here, and here. Recently, the Seventh Circuit rejected a nonprofit group’s argument that Indiana’s anti-robocall statute violated the First Amendment because it did not exempt robocalls involving political speech. Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Zoller, No. 16-2059, 2017 U.S.App. LEXIS 47 (Jan. 3, 2017). Continue reading “Seventh Circuit Rejects Political Speech Challenge to Indiana’s Anti-Robocall Statute”
Courts Continue to Grapple with Article III Jurisdictional Questions in the Wake of Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez
Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2. Accordingly, as the Supreme Court recently clarified, “[i]f an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016). In the long-awaited decision, the Campbell-Ewald majority held that an unaccepted offer of complete relief under Rule 68, alone, does not moot a claim and thus does not deprive a court of Article III jurisdiction over the action. However, in so ruling, the majority emphasized that the fact that the offer was unaccepted was critical to its decision, thus leaving unanswered a host of scenarios in which a defendant makes an actual full payment or an unconditional tender to the plaintiff, and the court enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount. Continue reading “Courts Continue to Grapple with Article III Jurisdictional Questions in the Wake of Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez”