As we previously reported, on July 17, 2014, the FCC filed a letter brief in Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, Inc. v. Sarris, No. 13-14013 (11th Cir.) (“Sarris”), in which it took the position that entities can be held directly liable under the TCPA whenever their products or services are advertised in an unsolicited fax—even if they did not actually send the fax, and even if they did not know the fax was going to be sent. The FCC’s letter brief stood in marked contrast to its decision last year in In re Joint Petition Filed by Dish Network, LLC, 28 F.C.C. Rcd. 6574 (2013) (“Dish Network”), where the FCC had limited direct liability to only “telemarketers” that “initiate” calls, and otherwise applied agency principles to determine whether “sellers” might be vicariously liable for calls made on their behalf. As readers may recall, the FCC’s letter brief does not articulate a policy reason why a “seller” in the voice call context should receive more protection than an entity whose goods and services are promoted through a fax advertisement. But whatever the merits of the letter brief, it has yet to be cited by the Eleventh Circuit (which has heard argument but not yet issued an opinion) or, at least for the past few months, any other court.
Somewhere Out There, a Certain Gecko Lets Out a Sigh of Relief
Judge Kathleen M. Williams of the Southern District of Florida handed GEICO a decisive victory on September 29, 2014, when she denied a renewed motion to certify a class of individuals who purportedly received robo-calls from GEICO because she found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient proof of numerosity.
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Eighth Circuit Reverses Summary Judgment, Directs Trial Court to Determine Whether Consent Was Revoked
In an unpublished, per curiam decision, the Eighth Circuit recently reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of a defendant and directed the district court to address whether the plaintiff had revoked his consent to being called on his cell phone. Brenner v. Am. Ed. Servs., No. 14-1340, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18416 (8th Cir. Sept. 26, 2014).
Court Holds That Twombly/Iqbal Pleading Standard Does Not Apply to Affirmative Defenses in TCPA Case
In a TCPA action concerning allegedly unsolicited fax advertisements, the Eastern District of Michigan recently rejected the argument that the plausibility standard articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) applies to affirmative defenses. See Exclusively Cats Veterinary Hospital, P.C. v. Pharmaceutical Credit Corp., No. 13-14376, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132440 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2014).
Eleventh Circuit Holds That Debt Collector Had “Prior Express Consent” From Debtor Whose Wife Provided Number on Hospital Admission Form
This week the Eleventh Circuit held that a debt collector had “prior express consent” from a debtor whose wife had provided his wireless number on a hospital admission form. Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., No. 13-14008, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18554 (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 2014). In doing so, it reversed an outlier decision from the Southern District of Florida, adopted arguments that the FCC had made in an amicus brief late last year, and provided persuasive precedent on the “prior express consent” exception.
Court Rules That Settlement Term Sheet Is Not Worth The Paper It’s Written On
Judge Amy J. St. Eve of the Northern District of Illinois recently held that a purported settlement agreement in a putative class action filed by Craftwood Lumber Co. against Interline Brands, Inc. was not enforceable. See Craftwood Lumber Co. v. Interline Brands Inc., No. 11-4462 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 23, 2014). Judge St. Eve held that the “Term Sheet” executed at the end of the parties’ mediation session lacked sufficient detail to establish that a binding and enforceable settlement had been reached.
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State Courts Disagree About Whether Statutory Damages Make Class Actions an Inferior Method for Adjudicating TCPA Claims
The statutory damages that have caused so many plaintiffs to file TCPA class actions have also caused some courts to find that class actions are not the superior method for adjudicating them. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) requires not only that common questions predominate over individual ones, but also that “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Whether a class action is the superior method for adjudication depends on a number of stated and unstated considerations, among them “the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A). As we have noted before, some courts have held that TCPA claims are categorically unfit for class treatment because $500-$1,500 plus attorneys’ fees and costs is adequate to incent individuals to file claims, is disproportionate to any actual damages, and is potentially ruinous if aggregated in a class action. Two state courts recently addressed this issue and reached contrary conclusions.
FCC Letter Brief Suggests That Faxes and Phone Calls are Different for Purposes of Direct Liability Under the TCPA
At the invitation of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the FCC recently filed a letter brief in Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, Inc. v. Sarris, No. 13-14013 (11th Cir.). The letter brief took the position that defendants can be held directly liable any time their products or services are advertised via a fax that violates the TCPA—even if they did not send the fax or even know that it was going to be sent.
W.D. Wash. Adopts Preponderance of the Evidence Standard for Elements of Class Cert., Rejects Numerosity Experts
The Western District of Washington recently adopted a “preponderance of the evidence” standard for establishing the prerequisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and denied class certification in a TCPA case because the plaintiffs’ expert testimony did not meet the rigors of even a preponderance standard. See Southwell v. Mortgage Investors Corp. of Ohio, No. 13-1289 , 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112362 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 12, 2014).