Topic: Campbell-Ewald

Court Holds that Pre-Suit Offer Did Not Moot Claims

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida recently held that a defendant’s pre-suit proffer of a settlement check and a letter promising not to violate the TCPA in the future did not moot the plaintiff’s claims because the plaintiff did not accept the offer. Edelsberg v. Brea Fin. Gp., LLC, No. 18-cv-62119, 2019 WL 1302828 (S.D. Fla. Eb. 26, 2019). The case highlights the ongoing litigation regarding Article III standing in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016). Continue reading “Court Holds that Pre-Suit Offer Did Not Moot Claims”

Second Circuit Follows Seventh Circuit, Finds that Rule 67 Tender Does Not Moot Claims

Nearly three years ago, in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, the Supreme Court held that claims are not mooted by unaccepted offers of complete relief under Rule 68 because they create neither an “obligation” to provide nor an “entitlement” to receive any relief. But the Court expressly left open the possibility that depositing the full amount of a plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff might be enough. Continue reading “Second Circuit Follows Seventh Circuit, Finds that Rule 67 Tender Does Not Moot Claims”

Seventh Circuit Rules that Rule 67 Does Not Provide an Avenue to Mootness

After the Supreme Court held in Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez that merely offering to make a payment will not moot a claim, we predicted that defendants would explore various procedural mechanisms for arguing that actually making a payment will moot a plaintiff’s claim. Indeed, although the Supreme Court did not reach the issue, its decision strongly suggested that plaintiffs who have received complete relief—as opposed a mere offer of complete relief—no longer have live cases or controversies as required by Article III. See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (Feb. 9, 2016) (“We need not, and do not, now decide whether the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.”). This week, however, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that not even tendering funds into a court-monitored interest-bearing account is enough to moot a claim. See Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574 (June 20, 2017). What, if anything, would be enough it did not say. Continue reading “Seventh Circuit Rules that Rule 67 Does Not Provide an Avenue to Mootness”

Courts Continue to Grapple with Article III Jurisdictional Questions in the Wake of Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez

Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2. Accordingly, as the Supreme Court recently clarified, “[i]f an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016). In the long-awaited decision, the Campbell-Ewald majority held that an unaccepted offer of complete relief under Rule 68, alone, does not moot a claim and thus does not deprive a court of Article III jurisdiction over the action. However, in so ruling, the majority emphasized that the fact that the offer was unaccepted was critical to its decision, thus leaving unanswered a host of scenarios in which a defendant makes an actual full payment or an unconditional tender to the plaintiff, and the court enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount. Continue reading “Courts Continue to Grapple with Article III Jurisdictional Questions in the Wake of Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez”

Second Circuit Moots Class Claims Based on Offer of Judgment

The Second Circuit last week confirmed that entries of judgment satisfying an individual plaintiff’s claims moot TCPA class actions.

In Bank v. Alliance Health Networks, LLC, No. 15-cv-4037 (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 2016), the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the class claims after an entry of judgment, pursuant to the defendants’ offer of judgment, rendered the class claims moot. The Second Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court held in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) that an unaccepted offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff’s claims. “But where judgment has been entered and where the plaintiff’s claims have been satisfied, as they were here when [the plaintiff] negotiated the check, any individual claims are rendered moot.”  Continue reading “Second Circuit Moots Class Claims Based on Offer of Judgment”

FCC Issues Declaratory Ruling Confirming an Exemption from Certain of the TCPA’s Restrictions for the Federal Government and its Contractors When Acting within Scope of an Agency Relationship

The FCC recently issued a declaratory ruling addressing petitions that had been filed by Broadnet Teleservices LLC (“Broadnet”), National Employment Network Association (“NENA”), and RTI International (“RTI”), each of which sought guidance or clarification on the extent of the TCPA’s governmental exception when a contractor is placing calls or texts pursuant to its work on behalf of the government. Each of the petitioners provide, or have members that provide, calling services on behalf of federal government entities; Broadnet offers teletown hall calling services for state and local governments as well and RTI performs social science survey work for entities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). NENA represents providers of employment services to beneficiaries of Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income. These providers are required to contact program-eligible beneficiaries to provide information about potential programs and services.
Continue reading “FCC Issues Declaratory Ruling Confirming an Exemption from Certain of the TCPA’s Restrictions for the Federal Government and its Contractors When Acting within Scope of an Agency Relationship”