The Eastern District of Michigan recently denied a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because the defendant raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiff had revoked his consent to receive the challenged calls. See Mayang v. PAR Grp., Inc., No. 17-12447, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118784 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2018). Continue reading
Less than a week after the D.C. Circuit issued its mandate in the ACA Int’l v. FCC matter, the FCC has now asked for comments on critical TCPA issues in light of the D.C. Circuit’s now-final decision. See ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
In its May 14, 2018 Public Notice, the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau has identified several key issues on which it seeks comments, including the scope of the ATDS definition, how to treat calls to reassigned numbers, and standards for revoking consent. On each issue, the Notice confirms that the FCC is taking a much broader view of the TCPA landscape than it did in its 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order (“2015 TCPA Order”)—and is willing to consider, in light of the ACA Int’l decision, bright-line rules that will provide much-needed clarity to businesses and litigants. Continue reading
The District of New Jersey recently dismissed a class action TCPA complaint, finding that the plaintiff did not use a reasonable method of revoking consent when she failed to follow the defendant’s straightforward directions for providing such revocation. Rando v. Edible Arrangements Int’l, LLC, No. 17-0701, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51201 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2018). In doing so, the court’s decision further confirmed the position within the District that the totality of the circumstances dictates whether a method of revocation of consent is reasonable and thus valid in TCPA cases. Continue reading
A recent decision from the District of Maryland denied the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the Plaintiff had in the Court’s view raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he had revoked his consent to receive automated debt-related calls. But the Court also denied the Plaintiff’s motion for class certification for the same reason, finding that individualized issues regarding the provision and revocation of that consent would predominate over any alleged common issues. See Ginwright v. Exeter Fin. Corp., No. 16-0565 (D. Md. Nov. 28, 2017). Continue reading
Happy holidays to all the readers of the TCPA Blog! Below is a link to an article written by Michael Daly, Meredith Slawe, and John Yi on some recent decisions addressing contrived revocation of consent claims in text message based lawsuits.
Yesterday the District of New Jersey issued an important decision that reinforces—as we have explained before both here and elsewhere—that a plaintiff’s alleged revocation of consent must be reasonable rather than fanciful. Viggiano v. Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc., No. 17-0243 (D.N.J. Nov. 27, 2017).
Multiple district courts have recently examined whether, and in what circumstances, providing one’s phone number suffices to establish consent to be called under the TCPA. The issue is complicated, turning on whether prior express consent must be in writing, a determination which, in turn, requires examination of whether the call in question constitutes “telemarketing” or “advertising.”
We reported in June on a Second Circuit decision holding that a consumer cannot unilaterally revoke consent that she provided in a bilateral contract. “It is black letter law,” the court explained, “that one party may not alter a bilateral contract by revoking a term without the consent of a counterparty,” and that “consent to another’s actions can ‘become irrevocable’ when it is provided in a legally binding agreement.” As a result, the TCPA “does not permit a consumer to revoke his consent to be called when that consent forms part of a bargained-for exchange.”
A recent decision from the Northern District of Ohio highlights the importance of having a carefully drafted arbitration agreement in callers’ customer-facing contracts. See Treinish v. BorrowersFirst, Inc., No. 17-1371, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145772 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2017).
The Plaintiff in Treinish had borrowed money from the Defendant. Id. at *1. Their contract contained two notable provisions: a provision that agreed to resolve disputes in arbitration and a provision that consented to receive automated calls from the Defendant and related entities on her cellphone. Id. at *1-2. Continue reading