The Third Circuit’s recent decision in Perrong v. Bradford, 2025 WL 2825982 (3d Cir. 2025), serves as an important reminder that the TCPA does not apply to all automated telephone solicitations. In a case of first impression, the Court held that telephone solicitations made by state legislators when performing legitimate legislative functions for the public benefit fall outside the statute’s scope — underscoring that courts continue to interpret the TCPA narrowly and recognize meaningful limits on its application.
The plaintiff received five prerecorded calls sent by the Legislative Communications Office of the House Democratic Caucus on behalf of Pennsylvania Representative Matthew Bradford. After discovery, the district court denied Bradford’s motion for summary judgment, rejecting his argument that the TCPA did not apply to his conduct and his alternative claims of qualified and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Third Circuit reviewed the case under the collateral order doctrine based on the immunity claims.
The five calls at issue involved constituent services and government information: an upcoming information session on state-provided health insurance, pandemic resources, notification of government job opportunities, a family fair at a local zoo and an event for proper disposal of sensitive information. Each call was approved by the Legislative Communications Office under standards requiring “a clear legislative purpose and public benefit.”
The Third Circuit began by acknowledging the complex legislative and judicial history regarding which individuals and conduct fall within the TCPA’s scope, ultimately concluding that application to state legislators was an issue of first impression. Notably, the Court observed that TCPA application to government employees has been inconsistent depending on the specific statutory provision at issue — reflecting the judiciary’s ongoing effort to define the boundaries of the statute rather than assume universal application.
Applying established principles of statutory interpretation and federalism, the Court noted that when Congress intends to alter the constitutional balance between states and the federal government, it must do so unmistakably. Here, where the challenged conduct clearly involved a legitimate function of office for the public good, the Court held that the statute’s general use of the term “person” was not sufficiently “unmistakably clear” to support an inference that Congress intended to prevent state officials from carrying out legitimate legislative functions. The Court explicitly distinguished these public-benefit communications from calls relating to legislators’ personal affairs or reelection campaigns.
The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment and ended the litigation without reaching the immunity issues.
This decision reinforces that courts will not read the TCPA expansively beyond its text and that the statute contains meaningful exceptions and limitations. While the ruling addresses only state legislators performing official duties, the Court’s interpretive framework — requiring unmistakably clear congressional intent before restricting governmental functions and recognizing inconsistent application across different contexts — may inform future cases involving other categories of calls that serve important public interests.
