The Seventh Circuit has become the first federal circuit court of appeals to address whether the TCPA’s Do-Not-Call provision, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), creates a private right of action for unwanted text messages, holding that it does not and that the provision’s private right of action is limited to phone calls. Steidinger v. Blackstone Med. Servs., No. 25-2398, 2026 WL 2028517 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026) (Kirsch, J.). Our coverage of the lower court decision it affirmed can be found here.
The court based its decision on “the ordinary public meaning of telephone call at the time of the TCPA’s enactment” and “the context provided by surrounding provisions of § 227.” Id. at *1. Regarding the statute’s ordinary public meaning, the court explained that “telephone call” could not have covered text messages in 1991 — when the TCPA was enacted — because the first text message was not sent until the following year. Id. at *2. Further, in 1991, “telephone call” referred to communication via sound. Because text messages do not reproduce sounds, they do not qualify as a new application of that term. Id.
Regarding statutory context, the court observed that subsections (c)(1)-(4) consistently use the broader term “telephone solicitation,” which the TCPA defines to include both telephone calls and messages, whereas subsection (c)(5) creates a private right of action only for the narrower category of unwanted “telephone calls.” Id. The court acknowledged that it had previously stated texts qualify as “calls” under the TCPA. But it distinguished those decisions on two grounds: (1) they were based on a different provision, § 227(b); and (2) they predated the Supreme Court’s decision in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U.S. 395 (2021). It also noted that Duguid, along with Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (2016), had merely assumed, without substantively deciding, that text messages qualified as telephone calls. Id. at *3-4. For similar reasons, the court found unpersuasive decisions from other circuits — including the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Howard v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 164 F.4th 1119 (9th Cir. 2026) — holding that “texts are calls” under the TCPA, noting that each of those decisions, like the court’s own prior precedent, addressed § 227(b) rather than § 227(c)(5). Id. at *4.
The Seventh Circuit also declined to follow FCC interpretations of § 227(c). While the FCC has interpreted “call” to include text messages and extended the National Do-Not-Call Registry’s protections accordingly, the court noted that the FCC had not engaged in rulemaking to define the term for purposes of § 227(c)(5). Moreover, the Registry was implemented under § 227(c)(3) — which refers to “telephone solicitations” — rather than § 227(c)(5) which refers only to “telephone calls.” Id. Citing McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146, 148 (2025), the court held that it was not bound by the FCC’s interpretation and that questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Id. (“That the FCC may have a different interpretation of call as that word appears elsewhere in the statute or in other contexts isn’t sufficient to override our conclusion about the meaning of § 227(c)(5).”).
Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected the appellants’ policy arguments and broad invocation of the TCPA’s remedial nature, explaining that “Congress’s general concern about intrusive telemarketing practices doesn’t necessarily mean that it adopted a broad definition of telephone call.” Id. at *5. It further noted that spam text messages do not pose the same public safety risk as telemarketing calls, which can tie up telephone lines needed for emergency or medical assistance — making it “unsurprising” that § 227(c)(5)’s private right of action would not cover messages. Id.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision follows similar recent rulings from district courts in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. See, e.g., Davis v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 797 F.Supp.3d 1270 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2025); El Sayed v. Naturopathica Holistic Health, Inc., 2025 WL 2997759 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2025); McGonigle v. Pure Green Franchise Corp., 2026 WL 111338 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2026); Radvansky v. Kendo Holdings, Inc., 2026 WL 810929 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2026); Radvansky v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., 2026 WL 456919 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 17, 2026); Lopresti v. Nouveau Essentials Mktg. LLC, 2026 WL 965758 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2026); Stockdale v. Skymount Prop. Grp., LLC, 2026 WL 591842 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2026); Wilson v. Tradercodes, LLC, No. 1:25-cv-03211, Dkt. 33 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2026); Richards v. Fashion Nova, LLC, 2026 WL 847568 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2026); Richards v. Shein Distrib. Corp., 2026 WL 847584 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2026); James v. Smarter Contact, Inc., 2026 WL 879244 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2026); Irvin v. Sonic Industries Services, LLC, 2026 WL 1098403 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2026); Royal v. Ga. CVS Pharm., LLC, 2026 WL 1537161 (N.D. Ga. May 8, 2026); Internicola v. Mortgagepros, LLC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129255 (M.D. Fla. June 10, 2026).
It remains to be seen whether the appellants in Steidinger will seek a panel rehearing, rehearing en banc, or certiorari. Regardless, this decision will surely influence TCPA litigation nationwide. As Steidinger itself recognized, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Howard addressed the private right of action for ATDS claims under § 227(b) — a differently worded provision with a differently framed private right of action — and did not speak to § 227(c)(5), so the two decisions are not actually in tension. Some district courts within the Ninth Circuit, however, have read Howard expansively to extend its reasoning to § 227(c)(5) claims, which means Steidinger’s holding may be in tension with those district court decisions and could eventually prompt Supreme Court review. See, e.g., Miller v. Direct Gen. Ins. Agency, Inc., 2026 WL 1708531, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2026) (stating that although Howard concluded a text message constitutes a call under § 227(b)(1), the same reasoning applies under § 227(c)(5)); D’Agostino v. Circle K Stores Inc., 2026 WL 1098239, at *5 (D. Ariz. Apr. 23, 2026); Wilson v. Cirkul Inc., 2026 WL 1508003, at *2-4 (D. Or. Apr. 14, 2026); Taha v. Momentive Software, Inc., 2026 WL 974297, at *2-4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2026).
