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W.D. Texas Dismisses TCPA Claims at Pleading Stage for Failure to Adequately Allege Vicarious Liability

A federal court in Texas recently granted a motion to dismiss TCPA claims where the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that unidentified third-party telemarketers were acting as agents of the defendant, a question that is more often tested at summary judgment than at the pleading stage.

In Ortega v. Powur, PBC, No. 5:25-cv-0864-JKP, 2026 WL 711813 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2026), the pro se plaintiff alleged that he received multiple unsolicited telemarketing calls in April 2025 marketing solar products, despite having registered his number with the National Do-Not-Call Registry in 2012 and making repeated requests that the calls stop. When the calls persisted, the plaintiff feigned interest in order to schedule an appointment and identify the caller. During that call, the telemarketer used a fictitious business name and provided a nonexistent website address. The following day, a man identifying himself as Jose Daniel Laveaga called, identified himself as being from Powur, PBC, and stated that the earlier calls had come from Powur’s “marketing team.”

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Ohio Federal Court Rules TCPA’s DNC Provision Doesn’t Permit Text Message Lawsuits

A federal judge in the Northern District of Ohio recently held that text messages are not subject to the TCPA’s Do-Not-Call provision because they are not “calls” within the meaning of the statute. Stockdale v. Skymount Prop. Grp., LLC, et al., 2026 WL 591842 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2026).

In Stockdale, Plaintiff alleged that she received text messages from Defendants for several years after she placed her phone number on the National Do-Not-Call Registry. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint did not state a cognizable claim under the TCPA because the plain language of Section 227(c)(5) is limited to “telephone calls” and does not include text messages.

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Courts in Eleventh Circuit Find No Private Right of Action Under 227(c) for Texts

District courts in the Eleventh Circuit are increasingly finding that the private right of action for violation of the TCPA’s Do-Not-Call provisions does not apply to text messages. More recently, three judges in that Circuit dismissed claims under 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), holding that the statute’s reference to “telephone calls” does not extend to text messages. See Radvansky v. Kendo Holdings, Inc., 23-0214, Dkt. 57 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2026) (May, C.J.) (entering judgment on the pleadings; this decision is now on appeal before the Eleventh Circuit); Radvansky v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., 2026 WL 456919, at *3-5 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 17, 2026) (Thrash, J.) (granting motion to dismiss); Lopresti v. Nouveau Essentials Mktg. LLC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39599, at *6-13 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2026) (Lammens, M.J.) (recommendation to enter judgment on the pleadings). The Lopresti court also dismissed a claim under Section 227(b), which restricts the use of automated telephone equipment, for the same reason. Lopresti, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39599, at *11-12.

These decisions are consistent with several earlier decisions in the Eleventh Circuit and one in the Central District of Illinois. See McGonigle v. Pure Green Franchise Corp., 2026 WL 111338 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2026) (Singhal, J.) (granting motion to stay discovery pending resolution of motion to dismiss); El Sayed v. Naturopathica Holistic Health, Inc., 2025 WL 2997759, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2025) (Merryday, J.) (granting motion to dismiss); Davis v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 797 F.Supp.3d 1270, 1272 (N.D. Fla. 2025) (Winsor, C.J.) (granting motion to dismiss); see also Jones v. Blackstone Med. Servs., LLC, 792 F.Supp.3d 894 (C.D. Ill. 2025) (Hawley, J.) (granting motion to dismiss; this decision is now on appeal before the Seventh Circuit).

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Fifth Circuit Find’s FCC’s “Prior Express Written Consent” Rule Exceeded Its Statutory Authority

The Fifth Circuit has rejected the FCC rule that has imposed a heightened “prior express written consent” requirement—a requirement found nowhere in the TCPA’s plain language—for more than a decade.  See Bradford v. Sovereign Pest Control of Texas, Inc., No. 24-20379, 2026 WL 520620, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 2026). Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), it found that the “prior express written consent” rule is unenforceable because the FCC had exceeded its statutory authority in enacting it.

From 1991 to 2012 — more than 20 years — it had been the FCC’s consistent position that consent can be “expressed” simply by providing one’s number — i.e., without a “written” or “signed” agreement. See, e.g., In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 FCC Rcd. 8752, ¶ 31 (1992) (“[P]ersons who knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called…”). It was not until 2013 that the FCC reversed course, enacting a rule requiring that consent for certain communication not only be “express” but also that it be “written,” “bear[] the signature of the person called,” and include various and sundry disclosures the FCC deemed desirable. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(f)(9).

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