Category - "Prior Express Consent"

Court Dismisses Case for Failure to Plausibly Allege That Text Messages Constituted Telemarketing

The Southern District of New York recently granted a motion to dismiss in a putative TCPA class action because plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the texts at issue constituted telemarketing or contained advertising material, thus requiring plaintiff’s prior express written consent. The decision highlights the importance of pleading the specific content of the communication at issue in a TCPA case, which directly impacts the type of consent that is required. Continue reading “Court Dismisses Case for Failure to Plausibly Allege That Text Messages Constituted Telemarketing”

Testimonial Evidence Sufficient to Defeat Class Certification: Court Denies Class Cert on Basis of Defendant’s Testimony Regarding Its Compliant Practices

The Southern District of Ohio recently denied class certification because the defendant’s unrebutted testimony—which established that its procedures ensured that faxes were only sent to those who had given their prior express permission—created individualized issues that predominated over any common ones. See Sawyer v. KRS Biotechnology, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8595 (S.D. Oh. May 30, 2018).        Continue reading “Testimonial Evidence Sufficient to Defeat Class Certification: Court Denies Class Cert on Basis of Defendant’s Testimony Regarding Its Compliant Practices”

Senators Urge FCC to Act in the Face of ACA Int’l

On April 18, 2018, a group of fifteen Democratic senators addressed a letter to FCC Chairman Pai related to the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in ACA Int’l v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The letter notes that the ACA decision “struck down portions of a 2015 Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Omnibus Declaratory Ruling and Order limiting the definition of automatic telephone dialing systems (auto dialers), which are technologies that can be used to rapidly call and text large groups of consumers,” and expresses concern that “[w]hile the Court maintained the right to revoke consent, the Court’s ruling could be interpreted to suggest that callers could limit consumers’ method to revoke consent to receive robocalls and robotexts through provisions buried in contracts or service agreements,” which would “upend the meaning and the goals of the TCPA.” The senators ask Chairman Pai and the FCC to take the following actions: Continue reading “Senators Urge FCC to Act in the Face of ACA Int’l”

Class Decertified: Wireless Provider’s Data Demonstrates Individualized Issues of Consent

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently decertified a class after the defendant, Yahoo! Inc., submitted new evidence showing that tens of thousands of putative class members may have consented to receive the text messages at issue. See Johnson v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 14-2028 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2018).

The dispute relates to the Yahoo! Messenger service, which allows Yahoo! users to send text messages to cell phones. After a user would send an initial text message to a specific cell phone number, Yahoo! would send an additional “Welcome Message” text message to that number: “A Yahoo! user has sent you a message. Reply to that SMS to respond. Reply INFO to this SMS for help or go to y.ahoo.it/imsms.” The plaintiff alleges that these Welcome Messages violate the TCPA based on a theory that Yahoo! did not have the “prior express consent” of the “called party” (the third party to whom the Yahoo! user had sent the original text message). Continue reading “Class Decertified: Wireless Provider’s Data Demonstrates Individualized Issues of Consent”

District Courts Debate Whether Providing a Phone Number Establishes Consent

Multiple district courts have recently examined whether, and in what circumstances, providing one’s phone number suffices to establish consent to be called under the TCPA. The issue is complicated, turning on whether prior express consent must be in writing, a determination which, in turn, requires examination of whether the call in question constitutes “telemarketing” or “advertising.”

Continue reading “District Courts Debate Whether Providing a Phone Number Establishes Consent”

District Court Finds Text Message With Link To Sender’s App Might Qualify As Advertising

As businesses increasingly elect to use text messaging to communicate with consumers, they should be mindful that text messages are a frequent target of TCPA claims. FCC regulations require different degrees of consent depending on whether communications are commercial or informational; whereas businesses must have only “prior express consent” for purely informational texts, they must have “prior express written consent” for texts that include an advertisement or constitute telemarketing. (Certain other texts, for example those sent for an emergency purpose, are exempt from those requirements.) That begs the question: what qualifies as advertising or telemarketing such that the higher degree of consent is required? Continue reading “District Court Finds Text Message With Link To Sender’s App Might Qualify As Advertising”

District Court Finds a Text Message Sent to Complete a Transaction is Not Telemarketing

As customers increasingly elect text messaging as their preferred means of communication during online ordering, such messages can raise the risk of a potential TCPA claim asserting that the text is “telemarketing” for which the customer did not provide prior express written consent, as required by the statute. A recent and informative decision rejected such a claim, finding that such messages are not telemarketing if they simply “complete a transaction” initiated by the customer. Continue reading “District Court Finds a Text Message Sent to Complete a Transaction is Not Telemarketing”

Revocation of Consent Must Be Reasonable and Recollected

Two recent decisions rebuffed TCPA claims arising from calls or text messages that were received after the called parties had allegedly revoked their consent. The decisions reinforce that plaintiffs who intend to pursue such claims must: (1) revoke their consent in a reasonable rather than contrived manner; and (2) support their claims with specific facts rather than conclusory allegations. Continue reading “Revocation of Consent Must Be Reasonable and Recollected”

Are Insurance Renewal Notifications Telemarketing? Maybe.

As discussed here, the Central District of California recently granted summary judgment in favor of an insurance company after finding that a prerecorded call to the insured’s mobile phone, which reminded her to review her health plan options for the following year, was not telemarketing and therefore did not require “prior express written consent.” See Smith v. Blue Shield of Cal. Life & Health Ins. Co., No. SACV 16-00108-CJC-KES (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2017).

But just a few weeks ago, a different judge in the Central District reached the opposite conclusion in a similar case, and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Flores v. Access Ins. Co., No. 2:15-cv-02883-CAS-AGR (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2017) (available here). These two decisions illustrate how courts continue to grapple with the distinction between “telemarketing” and “informational” calls. Continue reading “Are Insurance Renewal Notifications Telemarketing? Maybe.”

Looking Lonely: Commenters Show Little Love for Serial Plaintiffs’ Petition

The initial comments are in on the Petition of serial plaintiffs Craig Moskowitz and Craig Cunningham to require written consent for autodialed informational calls, and reactions are overwhelmingly negative. A diverse group of trade associations, nonprofits, medical institutions, and others flooded the docket with over thirty formal comments opposing the Petition. In addition to these formal comments, there were several short, informal comments submitted via the FCC’s “express” filing system by employees of credit unions and other financial institutions opposing the Petition. Just three comments expressed support. Continue reading “Looking Lonely: Commenters Show Little Love for Serial Plaintiffs’ Petition”