Ninth Circuit “Voices” Its Rejection of Plaintiff’s Attempt to Expand TCPA

The Ninth Circuit recently rejected the argument that a text message qualifies as an “artificial or prerecorded voice” under the TCPA.  See Trim v. Reward Zone USA LLC, 2023 WL 5025264, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 20445 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2023).

There, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated the TCPA by sending text messages with promotional offers without her consent.  Specifically, she alleged that the defendant had sent her a message stating:  “Hiya Lucine, you are a valuable customer.  In these tough times, let us [] reimburse [you] for your shopping needs.”

As you may recall, the TCPA prohibits making “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using . . . an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a [ ] cellular telephone service. . . .”  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

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Eleventh Circuit Overturns Salcedo, Holding that One Text is Sufficient for TCPA Standing

In a unanimous en banc decision, the Eleventh Circuit recently held that “a single unwanted, illegal telemarketing text message” is sufficient to allege a concrete injury under the TCPA. Drazen v Pinto, No. 21-10199, 2023 WL 4699939 (11th Cir. July 24, 2023) (en banc).

Previously, the leading Eleventh Circuit precedent on Article III standing in text-message cases held that a plaintiff’s alleged receipt of a single unsolicited text in violation of the TCPA “d[id] not state a concrete harm that meets the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1172 (11th Cir. 2019). See our prior discussion of Salcedo here. Based on Salcedo, an Eleventh Circuit panel previously dismissed the Drazen appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the class definition did not meet Article III standing requirements because it included individuals who had received only a single text message. See our prior discussion of the Drazen panel decision here. The Salcedo opinion made the Eleventh Circuit an outlier of one, with every other federal appellate court to consider the question reaching the opposite conclusion. See Cranor v. 5 Star Nutrition, LLC, 998 F.3d 686, 690 (5th Cir. 2021); Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2020) (Barrett, J.); Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2019); Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017).

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E.D. Pa. Dismisses Serial Plaintiff’s TCPA Case on ATDS Grounds

On July 18, 2023, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed a TCPA claim filed by serial Plaintiff, Andrew Perrong.  Perrong v. Montgomery Cnty. Democratic Comm., No. 22-4475, 2023 WL 4600423 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2023). You can read our prior coverage of Perrong decisions here and here.

The present case centers around three phone calls Perrong received from the Montgomery County Democratic Committee and its associates. Perrong claimed that Defendants violated the TCPA by using an ATDS to contact him. The Defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Perrong’s complaint failed to state a claim because the device at issue randomly or sequentially dialed phone numbers from a preexisting list (such as a list of registered voters), rather than randomly producing phone numbers itself, and therefore did not qualify as an automatic telephone dialing system.

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Ninth Circuit Finds That One Text Can Cause Concrete Harm, Remands for Decision Regarding Whether Minors Can Consent

Ever since the Supreme Court confirmed that the TCPA’s autodialer restrictions apply only to devices that generate numbers randomly or sequentially, the plaintiffs’ bar has been digging deep for new theories of liability to fill the void. One example of that is Hall v. Smosh Dot Com, in which the plaintiff posits that minors cannot provide consent for purposes of the TCPA, and as a result that calls to minors with DNC-registered numbers necessarily violate the statute. That theory is hard to square with both tort law (which tells us that minors consent to more intrusive things all the time) and contract law (which tells us that contracts with minors are voidable rather than void). But the Ninth Circuit recently handed Hall a procedural win in the case—albeit one that should end up being Pyrrhic.

The case arises from five text messages sent over the course of seven months. Undeterred by the fact that her teenage son had requested the messages, the Plaintiff filed suit—in a class action, of course—under the TCPA’s DNC provisions. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). The trial court dismissed the case for lack of Article III standing, finding that the Plaintiff had failed to allege that she was either the “actual user” of the phone or the “actual recipient” of the messages. The Plaintiff appealed, arguing that she could have Article III standing even if she was neither of those things. The Ninth Circuit has now agreed, reversed the trial court, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

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Court Rejects Habitual TCPA Plaintiff’s Procedural Gamesmanship

In a recent condemnation of procedural “gamesmanship of the lowest order,” District Judge Michael M. Baylson not only denied a plaintiff’s request for a default judgment and for sanctions, but also sua sponte ordered the plaintiff to show cause why sanctions should not be issued against him.  The case is Perrong v. DVD II Group, LLC, 2023 WL 3229934 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 2023).

Plaintiff Andrew Perrong, who the court described as “a habitual litigant with extensive familiarity with the TCPA and court proceedings,” filed a TCPA action against Defendants DVD II Group, LLC and Kevin Knasel.  Mr. Perrong hired a process server, who successfully served Defendants on March 13, giving them until April 3 to respond according to the federal rules.

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More TCPA Calling and Texting Restrictions Proposed by the FCC

At the Federal Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) June 8 Open Meeting, the Commissioners voted to adopt a new Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“Notice”) designed to clarify and expand upon the ability of consumers to decide what calls or texts subject to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) they wish to receive.  The Notice addresses pending but unresolved petitions for declaratory rulings filed by a range of entities seeking clarification of a variety of TCPA policies.  The Notice also highlights the agency’s intention to adopt specific rules codifying stated FCC policies contained in prior orders so that consumer rights are “clear” and easy to understand.  Each of the areas addressed by the Notice could affect the compliance programs of callers and texters, and the Notice thus represents an opportunity to inform the FCC of practical consequences of its proposals before it acts to adopt new rules.

Revocation of Consent in “Any Reasonable Way”

In its 2015 Declaratory Ruling, the FCC stated that consumers who had provided prior express consent to receive autodialed or pre-recorded voice calls are free to revoke that consent through any reasonable means of notification to the calling or texting party.  The Notice proposes to formally adopt a rule incorporating that flexibility and prohibiting calling or texting parties from designating any exclusive means to revoke consent.  The proposed rule states that reasonable revocation methods “typically” include text messages, voicemail or email to any phone number or email address where the consumer “can reasonably expect” to reach the caller.  The Notice calls out the use of “STOP” as a widely recognized means of revoking consent and proposes that the FCC employ a presumption that such a message, if sent, it is to be treated as a revocation of consent message.  If text initiators do not allow or enable a reply to text function, then the FCC proposes that that entity be required to provide clear and conspicuous disclosure on each text as to how to revoke consent.

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Florida Governor Signs FTSA Amendments Into Law

Yesterday, Florida’s Governor signed HB 761, which makes significant changes to the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act (“FTSA,” Fla. Stat. § 501.059).

HB 761 states that these amendments will not only take effect immediately, but also apply retroactively to any pending FTSA action styled as a class action but was not certified as such before the Governor signed the law. But there are already signs that the law’s retroactivity provision will face challenges, including one court’s recent observation that the constitutionality of that particular provision is unclear. See Murray v. Riders Share, Inc., No. 6:22-cv-2329-PGB-DCI, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83388, at *3 n.2 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2023) (“Retroactive application of a civil statute ordinarily transgresses constitutional limitations on legislative power ‘if the statute impairs vested rights, creates new obligations, or imposes new penalties.’”).

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Florida Appeals Court Finds Lack of Standing in State Court TCPA Case

Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal recently reversed class certification and directed dismissal, holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish any concrete harm from an alleged violation of the TCPA and thereby lacked standing. Pet Supermarket, Inc. v. Eldridge, No. 3D21-1174, 2023 WL 3327267 (3d Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 10, 2023). (Note that this opinion has yet to be released for publication in the permanent law reports, as a motion for rehearing, clarification, or certification, or a petition for review, may be pending.)

Eldridge had visited the defendant’s store, where he learned about a promotion in which customers could win free dog food for a year if they enrolled in the defendant’s text-message program. After enrolling, Eldridge immediately received two texts, and then received an additional five texts over a period of six months. All the texts contained the message “Reply STOP to end” and concerned promotional or advertisement information.

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Florida District Courts Increasingly Staying FTSA Cases as 11th Circuit Threatens to Overturn Salcedo

Plaintiffs’ attempts to keep FTSA cases venued in Florida state courts are being upended by the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision to revisit en banc its Article III standing precedent in single-text message cases. Previously, Florida district courts were generally remanding such cases to state court. Since then, a couple of district courts have remanded cases to state court, but several more have stayed cases pending the Eleventh Circuit’s decisions in two pending appeals, Drazen v. Pinto, No. 21-10199 (11th Cir.) and Muccio v. Global Motivation, Inc., No. 23-10081 (11th Cir.). And the momentum appears to be in favor of staying such cases.

On April 11, Judge Honeywell of the Middle District of Florida granted a defendant’s unopposed motion to stay in Read v. Coty DTC Holdings, LLC,  pending the resolution of Drazen and Muccio. No. 8:23-cv-00662-CEH-MRM, 2023 WL 3431820 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2023). The plaintiff in Read had alleged receipt of a single text message in violation of the FTSA. Eleventh Circuit precedent on Article III standing holds that a plaintiff’s alleged receipt of a single unsolicited text message in violation of the TCPA does not meet the injury requirement for Article III standing. See Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1172 (11th Cir. 2019). However, the Eleventh Circuit recently vacated a panel decision that had reaffirmed that precedent to re-evaluate its application en banc. See Drazen. Additionally, another appeal before the Eleventh Circuit will address whether Article III injury exists for plaintiffs alleging receipt of multiple texts, not just one, and who allege a violation of the FTSA, not the TCPA. See Muccio. Against this backdrop, the Read court found that the Eleventh Circuit was an outlier with the holdings of other Courts of Appeal that have found standing does exist based on an unsolicited text message. Additionally, the court noted that the Eleventh Circuit’s precedent on this issue appears to have been called into question due to the pending appeals in Drazen and Muccio. As such, the court stayed the case.

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Eastern District of Pennsylvania Holds That Differentiating Service Is an “Advertisement” and Defendant’s Intent in Sending Fax Is Irrelevant

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reaffirmed that an objective “four corners” standard governs whether faxes are “advertisements” that must meet the TCPA’s consent requirement. Separately, any fax that compares the sender’s product or service to others could constitute an “advertisement” under the Court’s decision.

Background

In Steven A. Conner DPM, P.C. v. Fox Rehabilitation Services, P.C., 2023 WL 2226781 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2023), Plaintiff (a podiatrist) alleged that Defendant sent unsolicited faxes to his office during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic to promote its in-home physical therapy services. Plaintiff had never had contact with or made a referral to Fox Rehab before receiving the faxes. Fox Rehab testified at trial that it had sent the faxes to Plaintiff as part of a blast campaign to inform referring healthcare providers that it was adhering to recently issued public guidelines for stemming the spread of coronavirus. Since Fox Rehab admitted to having sent the faxes, the sole issue for the Court was whether they were “unsolicited advertisements” under the TCPA.

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